National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios and the Foreign Relations Effects Test: Searching for a Viable Approach by Thurston, Patrick J.
BYU Law Review
Volume 2000 | Issue 2 Article 8
5-1-2000
National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios and the
Foreign Relations Effects Test: Searching for a
Viable Approach
Patrick J. Thurston
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the International Relations Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Patrick J. Thurston, National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios and the Foreign Relations Effects Test: Searching for a Viable Approach, 2000
BYU L. Rev. 749 (2000).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2000/iss2/8
THU-FIN.DOC 5/20/00 11:17 AM 
 
749 
National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios and the 
Foreign Relations Effects Test: Searching for a Viable 
Approach 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Massachusetts Burma1 Law2 marked a significant develop-
ment in the foray of U.S. states and other subnational entities into 
the realm of foreign affairs. As its sponsor, State Representative 
Byron Rushing, noted, the Massachusetts Burma Law (the first state 
statute of its kind) “brought state government into the international 
movement to support democracy in Burma”3 by imposing on Burma 
economic sanctions intended to “vigorously combat well-
documented [governmental] repression and intolerance.”4 More 
 
 1. The country of Burma derives its name from the Burman ethnic group that consti-
tutes the majority of the population living in the region between India and Thailand. See 
Myanmar or Burma?, in BURMA: PROSPECTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE vii, vii (Robert I. 
Rotberg ed., 1998). The name Burma has been associated with this area since the nineteenth 
century, when the area was divided into Upper Burma, Lower Burma, and the hill territories. 
See id. In the late nineteenth century, British colonial rule consolidated the three sectors into 
one country called Burma. See MARTIN SMITH, BURMA: INSURGENCY AND THE POLITICS OF 
ETHNICITY 40 (2d ed. 1999). Following independence from Great Britain in January 1948, 
the country retained the name Burma until the present military regime changed it to Myanmar 
in June 1989. See Burma Takes Another Name: Now, the Union of Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES, June 
20, 1989, at A5. The name “Myanmar” is a contraction of the Burmese name for the country: 
“Myanmar naing-ngan,” meaning “nation of the swift and strong people.” See U Kyaw Win, 
Brutality in Burma, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1992, at A10. 
In keeping with the prevalent scholarly practice of not using a name “invented by a re-
gime that has no national legitimacy,” this Note will use the name Burma instead of Myanmar. 
Myanmar or Burma?, in BURMA: PROSPECTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE, supra at vii; see 
also Rudy Guyon, Comment, Violent Repression in Burma: Human Rights and the Global Re-
sponse, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 409, 410 n.1 (1992) (supporting the use of the name 
Burma “out of deference to the viewpoint that to [refer to the country as Myanmmar] lends 
legitimacy to a military junta whose thuggery and innumerable violations of human rights law 
continue to bring suffering to all the peoples of Burma”). 
 2. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 22(G)-(M) (West 1999). For a more detailed 
explanation of the statute’s provisions, see infra Part II.B. 
 3. Frank Phillips, Weld Expected to Sign Bill to Avoid Firms with Burma Ties, BOSTON 
GLOBE, June 21, 1996, at A30. 
 4. Letter from Representative Byron Rushing to Representative Christopher Hodgkins 
and Senator Warren Tolman, Committee of State Administration (Feb. 28, 1995) [hereinafter 
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specifically, the Massachusetts Burma Law sought to pressure 
Burma’s ruling military regime into ending its repressive practices 
and making democratic reforms. The law established so-called “se-
lective-purchasing” regulations5 that would bar the state from buying 
goods and services from companies doing business in Burma. In ef-
fect, such regulations would function as a secondary boycott against 
the Burmese government that would encourage companies falling 
within the regulations’ scope to desist their operations in Burma and 
thereby deprive the regime of badly needed foreign investment.6 Due 
to the law’s potential to “affect millions of dollars in state business” 7 
and act as an example for Congress and other states to follow, the 
law’s supporters considered it “more than symbolic action”8 in their 
efforts to “assist[] fledgling, democratic movements throughout the 
world.”9 
 
 
Rushing Letter], quoted in Daniel M. Price & John P. Hannah, The Constitutionality of United 
States State and Local Sanctions, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443, 462 (1998). 
 5. Selective-purchasing laws and regulations, also known as “selective contracting 
laws,” Frank Phillips, Mass. Poised to Act on Burma Sanction Bill Said to Interest Weld, BOSTON 
GLOBE, June 11, 1996, at A33 [hereinafter Mass. Poised to Act], attempt to use state or local 
governments’ economic influence to protest the practices and policies of foreign nations. In 
brief, such laws “either preclude companies that do business with a targeted regime from bid-
ding on government contracts, or award bidding preferences to companies that do not do 
business with the regime.” Matthew C. Porterfield, State and Local Foreign Policy Initiatives 
and Free Speech: The First Amendment as an Instrument of Federalism, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 
6 (1999) (footnote omitted). The Massachusetts Burma Law falls into the first category of se-
lective purchasing laws. See infra Part II.B (discussing the provisions of the Massachusetts 
Burma Law). 
 6. See Frank Phillips, Apple Cites Mass. Law in Burma Decision, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 
4, 1996, at B6 (quoting Representative Byron Rushing’s comment that Apple Computers’ de-
cision to end its operations in Burma due to the Massachusetts Burma Law accomplished “ex-
actly what we want[ed] this law to do”); see also Jon Marcus, Massachusetts Legislators Call for 
Ban on Burma Business, Assoc. Press Pol. Service, June 11, 1996, available in Westlaw, Wires 
File, 1996 WL 5388343 (quoting Representative Byron Rushing’s statement that “[o]ne of 
the reasons [selective purchase requirements have] become such an important strategy . . . is 
that the government [of Burma] is running out of money so they have started to try to increase 
foreign investment”). 
 7. Meg Vaillancourt, Mass. Becomes First State to Boycott Burma Business, BOSTON 
GLOBE, June 26, 1996, at A27 (quoting Massachusetts Governor William F. Weld); see also 
Phillips, supra note 5, at A33 (“[State Representative Rushing] said that despite the modest 
amount of funds involved in a Massachusetts sanctions bill on Burma, [approximately $1 mil-
lion in state contracts,] it would have far-reaching impact, including reviving efforts in Con-
gress to pass a similar national ‘selective contracting’ bill on Burma.”). 
 8. Vaillancourt, supra note 7, at A27. 
 9. Rushing Letter, supra note 4, at 462. 
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Unfortunately for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, two Ar-
ticle III courts have declared the Massachusetts Burma Law to be an 
unconstitutional usurpation of federal authority, particularly in the 
domain of foreign affairs. In November 1998, a federal district court 
judge in Massachusetts awarded a declaratory judgment against Mas-
sachusetts, holding the law to be unconstitutional under the United 
States Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Zschernig v. Miller,10 be-
cause the Massachusetts Burma Law “impermissibly infringe[d] on 
the federal government’s power to regulate foreign affairs.”11 Then, 
in National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios,12 the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals, in June 1999, affirmed the district court’s decision 
by agreeing that under Zschernig the Massachusetts “law interferes 
with the foreign affairs power of the federal government.”13 More-
over, in reviewing alternative arguments not reached by the trial 
court, the First Circuit also found that the Massachusetts Burma Law 
unconstitutionally encroached on federal authority by violating the 
Foreign Commerce Clause and was preempted by existing federal 
sanctions against Burma.14 Notably, however, the First Circuit’s deci-
sion to affirm the trial court’s ruling rested on its interpretation and 
treatment of the federal government’s authority over foreign affairs 
rather than its conclusions regarding the law’s validity under the 
Foreign Commerce Clause or federal preemption arguments.15 
Though the First Circuit’s opinion in Natsios appears to reject 
emphatically the validity of state-imposed economic sanctions while 
simultaneously severely constricting subnational entities’ ability to 
participate in the international arena, the fact that the United States 
Supreme Court recently granted both parties’ petitions to review the 
case16 suggests that the decision still contains some unsettled issues, 
 
 10. 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
 11. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 289 (D. Mass. 
1998), aff’d, National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. 
granted, Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999). 
 12. 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. granted, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999). 
 13. Id. at 45. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See id. at 77. 
 16. See Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999); 
see also 14 States Ask U.S. High Court to Restore ‘Burma Law,’ PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 21, 1999, 
at D7 (reporting that Massachusetts, supported by fourteen other states, asked the Supreme 
Court to hear the case and restore the Massachusetts Burma law); Group Opposed to Burma 
Law Doesn’t Oppose Supreme Court Hearing, Associated Press Newswires, Oct. 28, 1999, 
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particularly with respect to the constitutional relationship between 
federalism and foreign affairs.17 Indeed, a close examination of the 
First Circuit’s analysis of the case’s foreign affairs-related arguments 
reveals that the court’s construction of the federalism-foreign affairs 
relationship is flawed in several significant ways. For example, the 
court’s analysis of the federalism-foreign affairs relationship fails to 
give definite guidance for determining the scope of the connection 
between federalism and foreign affairs.18 Moreover, the court’s ap-
proach fails to incorporate, or at least adequately account for, recent 
trends in the law with respect to federalism, the end of the Cold 
War, and global interdependence. Though it remains unclear 
whether the First Circuit would have upheld the Massachusetts 
Burma Law under a construction that accounted for such factors, the 
court’s failure to employ such an approach in this case preserves the 
“vagueness within this area of jurisprudence [that] fosters inconsis-
tent judicial determinations as to which state laws infringe upon the 
federal government’s . . . foreign affairs power.”19 
This Comment contends that in National Foreign Trade Council 
v. Natsios, the First Circuit construed the federalism-foreign affairs 
relationship too broadly to effectively determine the constitutionality 
 
available in Westlaw, APWIRES File, 10/28/99, APWIRES 23:28:00 [hereinafter Group Op-
posed to Burma Law] (noting that the NFTC asked the Supreme Court to hear the case for the 
benefit of international trade concerns “if [the Court] believes the issues it raises are unset-
tled”); Frank Phillips, Court to Rule on Mass. Law Targeting Ties with Burma, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Nov, 30, 1999, at B2 (“In a move that could have far-reaching implications for states 
that seek to punish human rights abuses abroad, the US Supreme Court yesterday agreed to 
review the Massachusetts law that restricts state purchases from companies doing business in 
Burma.”). 
 17. See Group Opposed to Burma Law, supra note 16, at 23:28:00 (“[In asking the Su-
preme Court to hear the case,] [t]he NFTC further argued that the case of Massachusetts’ 
Burma law would be an appropriate vehicle for resolving questions of whether state and local 
governments have the right to forbid trade with companies doing business with selected for-
eign governments.”). In other words, the NFTC asked the Supreme Court to hear the case in 
part because, even though the First Circuit declared the Massachusetts law to be unconstitu-
tional, the court failed to provide a definite rule as to whether federalism endows subnational 
entities with a constitutional right to engage in foreign affairs and foreign policymaking by im-
posing economic sanctions on selected foreign countries. 
 18. One commentator made a similar criticism about the district court’s decision in Na-
tional Foreign Trade Council v. Baker. See Recent Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 2013, 2014 
(1999) (“By failing to articulate the specific ways in which the Burma Law had ‘more than an 
incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries,’ the court missed a crucial opportunity to clar-
ify current jurisprudence regarding state involvement in foreign affairs.”). 
 19. Id. at 2015. 
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of state-imposed economic sanctions.20 Part II summarizes the politi-
cal and human rights situation in Burma that prompted the enact-
ment of the Massachusetts Burma Law, the law’s provisions, and the 
law’s relationship to “constituent diplomacy”21 and related jurispru-
dence. Part III discusses the facts of Natsios and the First Circuit’s 
reasoning therein. Part IV analyzes the First Circuit’s construction of 
the federalism-foreign affairs relationship and determines that (1) in 
light of both globalization and the Supreme Court’s recent views of 
federalism, the First Circuit’s narrow approach is flawed and (2) the 
First Circuit should have employed a limited balancing approach that 
determines whether a subnational entity provides the appropriate po-
litical context in which decisions relating to foreign affairs can be 
made. 
 
 
 20. Thus, unlike the majority of scholarship dealing with either the Massachusetts 
Burma law or subnationally-imposed economic sanctions, this Comment will not explore the 
constitutionality of either the Massachusetts Burma Law or state-imposed sanctions in general. 
Examples of works that do explore such topics include: Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. 
McCall, Jr., The Constitutionality of State and Local “Sanctions” Against Foreign Countries: 
Affairs of State, States’ Affairs, or a Sorry State of Affairs?, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 307 
(1999) (arguing that state-imposed sanctions are unconstitutional); Howard N. Fenton, III, 
The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 
13 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 563 (1993) (discussing the inappropriateness and unconstitutional-
ity of local sanctions); Lynn Loschin & Jennifer Anderson, Massachusetts Challenges the Bur-
mese Dictators: The Constitutionality of Selective Purchasing Laws, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
373 (1999) (supporting the constitutionality of the Massachusetts Burma law); Price & Han-
nah, supra note 4 (arguing that state and local sanctions are unconstitutional); David 
Schmahmann & James Finch, The Unconstitutionality of State and Local Enactments in the 
United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma (Myanmar), 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
175 (1997); Joel P. Trachtman, Nonactor States in U.S. Foreign Relations?: The Massachusetts 
Burma Law, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROCEEDINGS 350 (1998) (leaning toward the view that 
the Massachusetts Burma law is constitutional); Alejandra Carvajal, Note, State and Local “Free 
Burma” Laws: The Case for Sub-National Trade Sanctions, 29 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 257 
(1998); Jay A. Christofferson, Comment, The Constitutionality of State Laws Prohibiting Con-
tractual Relations with Burma: Upholding Federalism’s Purpose, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 351 
(1998) (arguing that state sanctions are constitutional); Shawna Fullerton, Note, State Foreign 
Policy: The Legitimacy of the Massachusetts Burma Law, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 249 (1999) 
(defending the Massachusetts Burma law as constitutional); Jennifer Loeb-Cederwall, Note, 
Restrictions on Trade with Burma: Bold Moves or Foolish Acts?, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 929 
(1998) (arguing that the Massachusetts Burma law is unconstitutional). 
 21. John Kincaid, Constituent Diplomacy: U.S. State Roles in Foreign Affairs, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND POWER-SHARING IN THE POST–MODERN EPOCH 107, 107 
(Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1991). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Military Rule and Human Rights in Burma 
Burma has endured the harshness and brutality of authoritarian 
military rule for the majority of its existence as an independent state. 
The current regime, which calls itself the State Peace and Develop-
ment Council (SPDC),22 is the target of the Massachusetts Burma 
Law. The SPDC came to power in September 1988, succeeding the 
twenty-one-year authoritarian reign of General Ne Win.23 In the 
months preceding the SPDC’s ascent to power, widespread pro-
democracy protests had prompted Ne Win to step down as head of 
the military-dominated government, resulting in the appointment of 
a civilian in his stead. As protests continued, the SPDC led a savage 
coup to restore military control, killing thousands of people in the 
process. 
According to one scholar, the SPDC’s authoritarian methods of 
governance are best described as “a throwback to an earlier, more 
 
 22. In late 1997, the regime changed its name from the State Law and Order Restora-
tion Council (SLORC) to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). See Carvajal, 
supra note 20, at 257 (footnote omitted). 
 23. After staging a “constitutional coup” and ruling Burma through a caretaker gov-
ernment from 1958 to 1960, General Ne Win returned to power in 1962 through a coup-
d’etat and established an authoritarian, military-dominated socialist government. MYA SAW 
SHIN & TOM L. WILSON, BURMA/MYANMAR: U.S. POLICY AT THE CROSSROADS 5 (1996), 
reprinted in The Burma Freedom and Democracy Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1511 Before the 
Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 115 (1996). As mentioned 
above, in 1988, Ne Win stepped down in response to protests originating from a growing pro-
democracy movement within Burma. Though scholars disagree as to his precise relationship 
with the present regime, they agree that Ne Win exerts at least some degree of influence on the 
SPDC. Compare Guyon, supra note 1, at 416 (The SPDC “coup was a façade; Ne Win main-
tained control of government . . . from behind the scenes.”) (footnote omitted), with Robert I. 
Rotberg, Prospects for a Democratic Burma, in BURMA: PROSPECTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC 
FUTURE, supra note 1, at 3 (“Now nearly ninety, [Ne Win] still wields occasional authority 
from the background.”); see also Andrew Selth, The Armed Forces and Military Rule in Burma, 
in BURMA: PROSPECTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 100-01 (“To a large 
extent, the aging Ne Win no longer exercises day-to-day control over the government and 
armed forces, and his standing among the younger generation in the tatmadaw is nowhere near 
as great as it may have once been. As an historical figure prominent in Burma’s early struggles 
against ethnic and ideological insurgents, however, and later chief of the country’s armed 
forces, the ‘Old Man’ still commands a degree of respect and loyalty in military circles. More 
importantly, he has for many years seeded the army with like-minded proteges. . . . Ne Win is 
now old and infirm, and his power is on the wane. Until his death, however, he will continue 
to exercise influence over the [SPDC’s] policies and act to protect his favorites from jealous 
rivals.”) (footnote omitted). 
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nakedly brutal period of dictatorial excess.”24 A number of interna-
tional bodies (including the United Nations) and human rights or-
ganizations “consistently rank the [SPDC] as among the worst re-
gimes for its lack of respect for human rights.”25 Reported human 
rights violations include “[m]urder and [s]ummary [e]xecution,”26 
“[s]ystematic [r]acial [d]iscrimination,”27 forcible eviction and popu-
lation relocation,28 “[p]rolonged [a]rbitrary [d]etention,”29 torture,30 
rape,31 and “[p]ortering,”32 among other forms of forced labor.33 In 
all, the SPDC’s human rights practices violate the human rights pro-
visions of the United Nations Charter and five other international 
treaties considered legally binding on Burma, as well as established 
norms of customary international law.34 
Although the United Nations and many countries have repeat-
edly and firmly condemned the SPDC’s human rights abuses, the 
overall “international response [to the situation] has at best been 
mixed”:35 some nations have imposed economic sanctions against the 
regime while others have maintained or expanded their economic ac-
tivities with or in Burma.36 In 1996 and 1997, the United States 
 
 24. Rotberg, supra note 23, at 1. 
 25. SHIN & WILSON, supra note 23, at 14, reprinted in The Burma Freedom and De-
mocracy Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1511 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Ur-
ban Affairs, 104th Cong. 124 (1996). 
 26. Guyon, supra note 1, at 424. 
 27. Id. at 425. 
 28. See id. at 426. 
 29. Id. at 426. 
 30. See id. at 427. 
 31. See id. at 427-28. 
 32. Id. at 428. “Portering” involves the abduction of civilians, usually of minority ethnic 
groups, to physically carry ammunition and supplies for army units. See id. 
 33. See SHIN & WILSON, supra note 23, at 13, reprinted in The Burma Freedom and 
Democracy Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1511 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and 
Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 115 (1996). 
 34. See Guyon, supra note 1, at 428-37 (examining the manner in which Burma’s hu-
man rights practices violate the United Nations Charter, the Convention on the Prevention of 
Genocide, the Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention, the ILO Convention Concerning 
Forced Labour, the ILO Convention Concerning the Rights of Association and Combination 
of Agricultural Workers, the Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection 
of the Right to Organize, and precepts of customary international law). 
 35. Id. at 444. 
 36. See id. at 444-58 (examining the manner in which various countries (especially Asian 
countries), international organizations, and multinational corporations have maintained or in-
creased their economic ties with, and calling for the imposition of more and stronger sanctions 
against, Burma). 
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joined the ranks of those countries using economic sanctions by bar-
ring financial assistance to Burma and prohibiting all future United 
States investment there.37 As the First Circuit observed in its discus-
sion of federal preemption in National Foreign Trade Council v. 
Natsios,38 the federal government’s measures were less severe in their 
scope than those established by the Massachusetts Burma Law.39 
B. The Massachusetts Burma Law 
Signed into law some three months before Congress approved 
national sanctions against Burma,40 the Massachusetts Burma Law41 
sought to “vigorously combat well-documented [governmental] re-
pression and intolerance in Burma”42 while encouraging Congress to 
impose similar measures.43 Notably, the law received such strong 
support from both houses of the Massachusetts state legislature “that 
it [would] likely [have] become law [through a veto override], even 
if [Governor William F.] Weld [had] vetoed it.”44 
On account of its status as a selective purchasing law, the Massa-
chusetts Burma Law severely restricted the ability of both the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts and its agents to procure approximately 
one million dollars worth of goods or services45 from individuals or 
companies engaged in business in or with Burma. Simply put, the 
law prohibited state entities and agents from making such purchases 
from any entity included on a state-maintained46 “restricted purchase 
 
 37. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 
570(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-166 to -167 (1996) (barring United States assistance to 
Burma); Exec. Order No. 13,047, 31 C.F.R. pt. 537 (1999) (prohibiting “United States per-
sons” from making, approving, or facilitating for non-United States persons new investment in 
Burma). In issuing the Executive Order, President Clinton acted pursuant to authority granted 
him by Congress to impose conditional sanctions on Burma. See § 570(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-
167 (authorizing the president to impose conditional sanctions on Burma). 
 38. 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. granted, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999). 
 39. See id. at 75 (“Some actions lawful under federal law would be unlawful under the 
state statute.”). 
 40. Massachusetts Governor William F. Weld signed the Burma bill into law on June 25, 
1996. See Vaillancourt, supra note 7, at A27. 
 41. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 22(G)-(M) (West 1999). 
 42. Rushing Letter, supra note 4, at 462. 
 43. See Phillips, supra note 5, at A33. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. (quoting State Representative Rushing’s estimate that the Massachusetts 
Burma Law will not affect much more than $1 million in state contracts). 
 46. The law requires the state Secretary of Administration and Finance to compile the 
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list,”47 comprised of individuals or corporations determined to be 
“doing business with Burma (Myanmar).”48 As defined by the law, 
“doing business in Burma” embraced a broad range of activities, in-
cluding: 
(a) having a principal place of business, place of incorporation 
or . . . corporate headquarters in Burma (Myanmar) or having 
any operations, leases, franchises, majority-owned subsidiaries, 
distribution agreements, or any other similar agreements in 
Burma (Myanmar), or being the majority-owned subsidiary, li-
censee or franchise of such a person; 
(b) providing financial services to the government of Burma 
(Myanmar), including providing direct loans, underwriting 
government securities, providing any consulting advice or assis-
tance, providing brokerage services, acting as a trustee or es-
crow agent, or otherwise acting as an agent pursuant to a con-
tractual agreement; 
(c) promoting the importation or sale of gems, timber, oil, gas or 
other related products, commerce in which is largely controlled 
by the government of Burma (Myanmar), from Burma 
(Myanmar); 
(d) providing any goods or services to the government of Burma 
(Myanmar).49 
Notably, the state could purchase goods or services from a party 
found to be “doing business in Burma” when “the procurement 
[was] essential”50 and compliance with the general rule “would 
[have] eliminate[d] the only bid or offer, or would [have] result[ed] 
in inadequate competition.”51 However, the procurement contract 
could be awarded to such a party “only if there [were] no  
 
 
 
restricted purchase list and update it every three months using various public and private re-
ports and similar sources. See ch. 7, § 22(J)(a)-(c). The Secretary must also provide copies of 
the list to all state entities. See id. at § 22(J)(d). 
 47. Id. at § 22(H)(a). 
 48. Id. at § 22(J)(a). 
 49. Id. at § 22(G). 
 50. Id. at § 22(H)(b)(1). 
 51. Id. at § 22(H)(b)(2). 
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comparable low bid or offer by a person who [was] not on the re-
stricted purchase list.”52 
With respect to relevant procedural norms, the law obligates 
state entities to provide advance notice of the law’s requirements to 
all parties that desire to bid on state contracts.53 Moreover, prior to 
reviewing multiple bids or awarding a contract to an only bidder, the 
awarding entity needs to receive a declaration from the bid-
der’s/offeror’s “authorized representative” stating “the nature and 
extent to which [the bidding party was] engaging in activities which 
would subject said person to inclusion on the restricted purchase 
list.”54 
C. “Constituent Diplomacy,”55 Federalism, and Foreign Affairs 
Despite its status as the first state statute to impose economic 
sanctions on Burma, the Massachusetts Burma Law itself cannot be 
considered an innovation in the relationship between federalism and 
United States foreign affairs law. During the past thirty years, state 
and local governments have substantially increased their participation 
in “foreign affairs activities conducted by constituent governments 
and subnational entities,” a phenomenon aptly dubbed “constituent 
diplomacy.”56 In 1986, one report estimated that “more than 1000 
U.S. state and local governments of all political stripes are participat-
ing in foreign affairs, and their numbers are expanding.”57 Today, 
thanks in part to such factors as heightened subnational desire for 
constituent autonomy,58 increasing global interdependence,59 the 
growing complexity of the international arena,60 and the governmen-
talization of the international marketplace,61 constituent diplomacy 
touches a wide range of activities, including efforts to pursue interna-
 
 52. Id. at § 22(H)(d). 
 53. See id. at § 22(H)(c). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Kincaid, supra note 21, at 107. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 115, 115 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990) (footnote 
omitted). 
 58. See Kincaid, supra note 21, at 108-11. 
 59. See id. at 111-13. 
 60. See id. at 113-15. 
 61. See id. at 115-17. 
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tional trade and investment,62 expressing opinions on national for-
eign policy,63 and, “[p]erhaps most dramatically,” imposing “eco-
nomic sanctions on foreign governments. . . through, for example, 
selective purchasing laws.”64 The Massachusetts Burma Law, there-
fore, cannot be considered more than constituent diplomacy in ac-
tion. 
“Somewhat surprisingly,” one scholar noted, “despite the scope 
and extent of this recent state and local involvement in foreign af-
fairs, it has occasioned little reaction from Congress or the Executive 
and few cases in the courts.”65 The lack of federal resistance has un-
doubtedly benefited constituent diplomacy efforts by allowing them 
to proceed uninhibited. At the same time, however, the lack of fed-
eral involvement—especially the lack of cases challenging the validity 
of these constituent diplomacy endeavors—has allowed the jurispru-
dence delineating the constitutional relationship and boundaries be-
tween federalism and foreign affairs to remain vague,66 “uncertain,”67 
and “amorphous.”68 Consequently, there exists a very real risk that 
inconsistent judicial conclusions regarding which state actions unlaw-
fully encroach on the federal government’s foreign affairs power 
could “grant constitutional validation of some state laws that inter-
fere with a unified national foreign affairs agenda.”69 
D. Supreme Court Precedent: Zschernig v. Miller 
Courts and scholars agree that the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Zschernig v. Miller,70 though decided in 1968, “most directly consid-
ered the boundaries of permissible state activity in the foreign affairs 
context.”71 In Zschernig, the Court invalidated an Oregon statute 
that allowed nonresident aliens to inherit real property from a state 
 
 62. See Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1089, 1097-98 (1999). 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. at 1098. 
 65. Bilder, supra note 57, at 117. 
 66. See Recent Cases, supra note 18, at 2015. 
 67. A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 1, 27 (1995). 
 68. Loschin & Anderson, supra note 20, at 400. 
 69. Recent Cases, supra note 18, at 2015. 
 70. 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
 71. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 51 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. 
granted, Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999). 
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resident only if (1) the alien’s country permitted United States citi-
zens to inherit real property and (2) the alien beneficiaries enjoyed 
the right to have the property without the risk that their country 
might confiscate the inheritance.72 In holding the Oregon statute in-
valid, the Court distinguished the case before it from Clark v. Al-
len,73 a previous decision in which the Court had upheld a similar 
California reciprocity statute.74 The difference between the two cases, 
according to the Court, stemmed from “the posture of the present 
[Zschernig case]”:75 Clark focused on the statute’s facial validity, but 
the [Zschernig] challenge to the Oregon statute involved “the man-
ner of [the statute’s] application.”76 
To support its holding that the Oregon statute was “an intrusion 
by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution 
entrusts to the President and the Congress,”77 the Court determined 
that the statute “ha[d] more than ‘some incidental or indirect effect 
in foreign countries,’ and . . . great potential for disruption or em-
barrassment” of national foreign policy.78 Though the Court failed 
to define the precise parameters of this so-called “foreign relations 
effects test,”79 the Court identified several facts that, in its view, ei-
ther directly affected foreign countries or exposed U.S. foreign policy 
to potential embarrassment or disruption. These factors included the 
fact that (1) the efforts of the Oregon courts to apply the Oregon 
law had led state court judges to criticize foreign governments, 
statements of foreign diplomats, and the administration of foreign 
law,80 (2) probate courts of various states also had made disparaging 
comments about foreign governments while deciding cases involving 
similar inheritance statutes,81 and (3) in a separate case, the govern-
ment of Bulgaria had contacted the State Department and objected 
to the Oregon law.82 Significantly, the Court held the Oregon stat-
 
 72. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430-31. 
 73. 331 U.S. 503 (1947). 
 74. See id. at 516-17. 
 75. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 432. 
 78. Id. at 434-35. 
 79. Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1396 (1999). 
 80. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434-36. 
 81. See id. at 438 n.8. 
 82. See id. at 437 n.7. Interestingly enough, commentators such as Professor Harold G. 
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ute unconstitutional even though the statute pertained to probate 
matters, an area traditionally left to the state; conflicted with no 
treaty or federal law; and had been characterized by the Justice De-
partment as not “unduly interfer[ing] with the United States’ con-
duct of foreign relations.”83 
Zschernig thus established a general framework for analyzing the 
propriety of state involvement in foreign affairs by establishing a fac-
tually specific “foreign relations effects test”84 to be applied to the 
state action in question. The overall value of the framework, how-
ever, remains debatable, because Zschernig failed to determine the 
framework’s scope or requirements. In effect, Zschernig is the cause 
of much of the confusion relating to the federalism-foreign affairs re-
lationship. Consequently, as might be predicted, courts have varied 
in their approach to how the foreign effects test should be construed 
under Zschernig.85 
 
Maier have argued the Zschernig Court erred in its application of these factors to the facts of 
the case: “No one of these conclusions is effectively supported by the facts in the Zschernig 
case. There was no showing of an adverse effect on relations with East Germany and no evi-
dence of overt or implicit criticism of the East German Government by any of the Oregon 
courts . . . .” Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 832, 836 (1989). 
 83. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434. 
 84. See Goldsmith, supra note 79, at 1396. 
 85. Compare, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989) (uphold-
ing the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance requiring divestment by city workers’ pen-
sion fund of investments in companies doing business in South Africa), with Springfield Rare 
Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300 (Ill. 1986) (invalidating an Illinois state stat-
ute that excluded South African coins from state tax exemptions applying to coins and currency 
circulated by other countries). See also Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (upholding a Pennsylvania state “Buy American” statute under Zschernig because 
the law did not require state officials or judges to appraise the policies of other nations, and 
treated all foreign countries in the same fashion); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm’rs, 
80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (Ct. App. 1969) (declaring a California “Buy American” statute unconstitu-
tional under Zschernig because the law presented “great potential for disruption” with estab-
lished federal trade policies); K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply 
Comm’n, 381 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977) (holding a New Jersey state “Buy American” law to be 
constitutional under Zschernig because the law did not involve any criticism of foreign gov-
ernments). 
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III. NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL V. NATSIOS 
A. The Facts 
In the trial court phase of Natsios,86 the National Foreign Trade 
Council (NFTC), a nonprofit, Washington, D.C.-based organization 
with over 600 corporate members,87 brought suit against Charles D. 
Baker, then Secretary of Administration and Finance of the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts, and other state officers in their official 
capacity as state officials, claiming that the Massachusetts Burma Law 
was invalid.88 The NFTC specifically claimed that the law “(1) in-
trudes on the federal government’s exclusive power to regulate for-
eign affairs; (2) discriminates against and burdens international trade 
in violation of the Foreign Commerce Clause; and (3) is preempted 
by a federal statute and an executive order imposing sanctions on 
Myanmar.”89 The defendants challenged the NFTC’s claims, arguing 
that the case should be dismissed because no members of the NFTC 
had been injured by the Massachusetts Burma Law and therefore the 
NFTC lacked standing to sue.90 Even if the NFTC had standing to 
sue, the defendants argued that the Massachusetts Burma Law was 
not invalid because (1) it did not intrude on the federal govern-
ment’s federal affairs power,91 (2) federal law imposing sanctions on 
Burma did not conflict with and preempt the Massachusetts Burma 
Law,92 and (3) Massachusetts’ status as a market participant removed 
the law from under the Foreign Commerce Clause.93 
 
 
 
 
 86. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998), 
aff’d, National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 
Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999). 
 87. See Group Opposed to Burma Law, supra note 16. 
 88. See Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 289. Like the district court in Baker and the First Cir-
cuit in Natsios, this Note will refer to the defendant as the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
rather than Mr. Baker or Mr. Natsios. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. at 291. 
 92. See id. at 293. 
 93. See id. 
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After finding that plaintiff NFTC had standing to sue,94 the dis-
trict court granted summary judgment to NFTC based on the 
court’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Zschernig v. 
Miller, which, according to the district court, held that state laws are 
invalid if they have “more than ‘some incidental or indirect effect in 
foreign countries,’ or . . . ‘great potential for disruption or embar-
rassment’ of United States foreign policy.”95 In justifying its decision 
under Zschernig, the district court stated that the Massachusetts stat-
ute “unconstitutionally impinges on the federal government’s exclu-
sive authority to regulate foreign affairs [because it] has more than 
an ‘indirect or incidental effect in foreign countries,’ and a ‘great po-
tential for disruption or embarrassment.’”96 Notably, the district 
court declined to include in its holding any reference to NFTC’s 
Foreign Commerce Clause and federal preemption claims, noting 
that “neither argument is dispositive in this case.”97 On behalf of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Andrew S. Natsios, Baker’s suc-
cessor as Secretary of Administration and Finance, appealed the dis-
trict court’s ruling to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.98 
B. The Court’s Reasoning 
In affirming summary judgment, the First Circuit upheld the dis-
trict court’s ruling under three separate analyses.99 The court first 
sustained the district court’s finding that the law was invalid under 
Zschernig because it unconstitutionally encroached on the federal 
government’s foreign affairs authority.100 Then, accepting the oppor-
tunity to review the alternative claims deemed “not dispositive” by 
the district court, the First Circuit also found the law to be invalid 
 
 
 
 94. See id. at 289-90 (concluding that NFTC satisfied the Supreme Court’s three-part 
test for organizational standing as outlined in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 
432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)). 
 95. Id. at 290 (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1968)). 
 96. Id. at 291 (citation omitted). 
 97. Id. at 293. 
 98. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1999), 
cert. granted, Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999). 
 99. See id. at 44. 
 100. See id. 
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because it violated the Foreign Commerce Clause101 and was pre-
empted by existing federal law.102 
1. The federal government’s foreign affairs power 
In sustaining the district court’s holding that the Massachusetts 
Burma Law unconstitutionally infringed on the federal government’s 
authority over foreign affairs, the First Circuit divided Massachusetts’ 
assertions into two sets of arguments: “preliminary arguments” relat-
ing to the district court’s interpretation of Zschernig103 and 
“[a]dditional [a]rguments [r]egarding the [f]oreign [a]ffairs 
[p]ower.”104 
a. Arguments relating to Zschernig. With respect to Massachu-
setts’ Zschernig-related “preliminary arguments,” the court first re-
jected Massachusetts’ argument that the district court incorrectly in-
terpreted Zschernig. Contrary to Massachusetts’ claims, the court 
stated, Zschernig does not “instruct[] courts to balance the nation’s 
interests in a unified foreign policy against the particular interests of 
an individual state. Instead, Zschernig stands for the principle that 
there is a threshold level of involvement in and impact on foreign af-
fairs which the states may not exceed.”105 
The court then proceeded to refute Massachusetts’ argument 
that Natsios should be distinguished from Zschernig due to alleged 
key factual differences. Rejecting Massachusetts’ assertion that the 
Massachusetts Burma Law did not establish the level and frequency 
of scrutiny found in the law in question in Zschernig, the First Circuit 
employed the Zschernig court’s approach of identifying various fac-
tors that, in its view, either directly affected foreign countries or ex-
posed national foreign policy to potential embarrassment or disrup-
tion.106 As the court noted, 
The conclusion that the Massachusetts law has more than an inci-
dental or indirect effect on foreign relations is dictated by the com-
bination of factors present here: (1) the design and intent of the 
law is to affect the affairs of a foreign country; (2) Massachusetts, 
 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. at 52-59. 
 104. Id. at 59. 
 105. Id. at 52. 
 106. For a list of the factual factors identified by the Zschernig court, see supra Part II.D. 
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with it $2 billion in total annual purchasing power by scores of 
state authorities and agencies, is in a position to effectuate that de-
sign and intent and has had an effect; (3) the effects of the law may 
well be magnified should Massachusetts prove to be a bellwether 
for other states (and other governments); (4) the law has resulted 
in serious protests from other countries, ASEAN, and the European 
Union; and (5) Massachusetts has chosen a course divergent in at 
least five ways from the federal law, thus raising the prospect of 
embarrassment for the country.107 
It should be emphasized that the only factor common to the findings 
of both the First Circuit and the Zschernig court involved the exis-
tence of foreign countries’ objections to the law at issue. 
After briefly demonstrating how its approach in Natsios “is 
largely consistent with that taken by the few other courts that have 
considered challenges to state and local laws brought under Zscher-
nig,”108 the First Circuit denied Massachusetts’ final Zschernig-
related argument: the Supreme Court’s decision in Barclays Bank 
PLC v. Franchise Tax Board109 “means that only Congress, not the 
courts, should ever determine whether a state law interferes with the 
foreign affairs power of the federal government.”110 In Barclays, the 
Supreme Court upheld a California state law establishing reporting 
requirements to be used in calculating corporate franchise taxes of 
multinational corporations, holding, in part, that only Congress has 
the authority “to evaluate whether the national interest is best served 
by tax uniformity, or state autonomy.”111 The First Circuit, however, 
held that Barclays does not apply to the foreign affairs power analysis 
because (1) the absence of both a state law that targeted another na-
tion and a claim that a state “was engaging in foreign policy”112 dis-
tinguished Barclays from Natsios and (2) “the Supreme Court did 
not cite to Zschernig in Barclays, thus keeping separate the analyses 
that apply when examining laws under the Foreign Commerce 
Clause and under the foreign affairs power.”113 
 
 
 107. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 53. 
 108. Id. at 55. 
 109. 512 U.S. 298 (1994). 
  110. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 58. 
 111. Barclays, 512 U.S. at 331. 
 112. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 59. 
  113. Id. 
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b. Arguments relating to the foreign affairs power. Having dis-
posed of Massachusetts’ Zschernig-based arguments, the First Circuit 
then quickly rejected several arguments that attempted to shield the 
Massachusetts Burma Law under three weighty constitutional doc-
trines. First, the court dismissed the “novel argument” that “the 
Massachusetts Burma Law can be upheld by applying a market par-
ticipant exception”114 to the foreign affairs power as interpreted in 
Zschernig.115 In declining to accept Massachusetts’ contention that 
the market participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause 
should be extended to the Foreign Commerce Clause and then to 
the foreign affairs power, the court noted that not only did the idea 
lack direct precedential support but it also ran contrary to the Su-
preme Court’s decisions regarding the market participant excep-
tion.116 
Second, the court then ruled that the Tenth Amendment does 
not protect the Massachusetts Burma Law. Massachusetts, the court 
concluded, had waived any direct Tenth Amendment claim it might 
have had by raising the argument only in a short footnote.117 How-
ever, even if Massachusetts had not waived such a claim, the court 
found that the Tenth Amendment still did not apply to Natsios be-
cause (1) the district court’s decision did not, contrary to Massachu-
setts’ suggestion, compel the state to do business with members of 
the NFTC and (2) even if such compulsion existed, it was “not simi-
lar to the federal government compulsion of states found impermis-
sible” under the Tenth Amendment.118 
Lastly, the First Circuit rejected the argument that the First 
Amendment should shield the Massachusetts Burma Law. Rather 
than suggesting that the First Amendment protects the Massachu-
 
 114. Id. The “market participant exception” is a judicially-created exception to the dor-
mant Commerce Clause, see LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 430-34 
(2d ed., 1988), which is itself a judicial creation that prevents states from unduly burdening or 
discriminating against interstate commerce. Id. at 404-08. One of several exceptions to the 
dormant Commerce Clause, the “market participant exception,” simply states that if a state, in 
enacting a law or regulation that favors in-state interests or burdens interstate commerce, acts 
as a market participant instead of a market regulator then the dormant Commerce Clause does 
not apply, and the state may favor its own citizens. Id. at 430. For more information regarding 
the scope of the exception, see id. at 430-34. 
  115. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 59. 
 116. See id. at 59-60. 
 117. See id. at 60-61. 
 118. Id. at 61. 
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setts Burma Law or that Massachusetts has First Amendment rights 
at stake in the case, Massachusetts asserted “that First Amendment 
values should weigh in favor of a finding that Massachusetts has sig-
nificant interests at stake . . . that should be considered under 
Zschernig.”119 The court refused to adopt this view, noting that (1) 
“the First Circuit has expressed doubt” that local governments have 
First Amendment rights,120 and (2) “[n]othing in Zschernig suggests 
that a state government’s First Amendment interests, if any, should 
weigh into a consideration of whether a state has impermissibly inter-
fered with the federal government’s foreign affairs power.”121 
2. The Foreign Commerce Clause 
In a claim not addressed by the district court,122 the “NFTC ar-
gue[d] that, regardless of whether the Massachusetts Burma Law 
violates the foreign affairs power, the law violates the dormant [For-
eign] Commerce Clause.”123 Massachusetts, however, maintained 
that (1) the law did not violate the Foreign Commerce Clause, and 
(2) even if the Massachusetts Burma Law did violate the Foreign 
Commerce Clause, Massachusetts’ status as a market participant 
shields the law because the market participant exception defense, 
recognized in domestic dormant Commerce Clause case law, should 
be extended to apply to the Foreign Commerce Clause.124 
Acting as the court of first impression, the First Circuit ruled 
against Massachusetts on all of the above issues, thereby invalidating 
the Massachusetts Burma Law under the Foreign Commerce 
Clause.125 Though the court declined to decide whether the market 
participant exception indeed applied to the Foreign Commerce 
Clause,126 the court ruled that under domestic dormant Commerce 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 293 (D. Mass. 
1998), aff’d, National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. 
granted, Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999) (de-
clining to decide the Foreign Commerce Clause issue because the argument “[was not] dispo-
sitive in this case”). 
 123. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 62. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. at 67. 
 126. See id. at 66. The court abstained from deciding the issue based on the fact that the 
Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue. See id. 
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Clause analysis, the market participant exception did not protect the 
Massachusetts Burma Law because Massachusetts, by enacting the 
law, acted as a market regulator rather than a market participant.127 
Moreover, the court found that the Massachusetts Burma Law vio-
lated the Foreign Commerce Clause because (1) the law “‘facially 
discriminates against foreign commerce’”128 while failing to “‘ad-
vance[] a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served 
by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives,’”129 (2) the law “im-
ped[es] the federal government’s ability to ‘speak with one voice’ in 
foreign affairs,”130 and (3) through the law, the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts impermissibly “attempts to regulate conduct beyond 
its borders and beyond the borders of this country.”131 
3. Federal Preemption of the Massachusetts Burma Law 
Moving to the second issue deemed nondispositive by the district 
court,132 the First Circuit finally examined the district court’s deci-
sion with respect to the NFTC’s claim that federal law preempted 
the Massachusetts Burma Law. In doing so, the court first reversed 
the district court’s nonbinding observation that “the NFTC ‘failed 
to carry [its] burden’ of showing ‘that Congress intended to exercise 
its authority to set aside a state law.’”133 According to the First Cir-
cuit, this erroneous observation resulted from the district court’s 
misapprehension of the NFTC’s burden of proof and resultant appli-
cation of the wrong legal standard to the facts.134 
The First Circuit then proceeded to determine that federal laws 
imposing sanctions on Burma preempted the Massachusetts Burma 
Law. Massachusetts contended that preemption had not occurred 
 
 127. See id. at 62-65. 
 128. Id. at 66 (quoting Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue and Fin., 505 
U.S. 71, 81 (1992)). 
 129. Id. at 70 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)). 
 130. Id. at 68 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448-
49 (1979)). 
 131. Id. at 69. 
 132. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 293 (1996), 
aff’d, National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 
Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999) (declining to 
decide whether federal law preempted the Massachusetts Burma Law due to the non-
dispositive nature of the issue). 
 133. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 71 (quoting Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 293). 
 134. See id. 
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because (1) Congress had impliedly permitted the Massachusetts 
Burma Law by failing to explicitly preempt the law when Congress 
knew about the law’s existence135 and (2) even if Congress had not 
implicitly permitted the Massachusetts Burma Law, the federal sanc-
tion laws had not preempted the Massachusetts Burma Law because 
Congress had not clearly manifested its intent that the federal laws 
do so.136 The court, however, rejected Massachusetts’ assertions, 
finding that (1) Congress did not implicitly approve the Massachu-
setts Burma Law by failing to explicitly indicate congressional intent 
for the federal sanctions to preempt the Massachusetts Burma Law137 
and (2) the federal Burma laws preempted the Massachusetts Burma 
Law because the federal laws sufficiently filled the foreign affairs field 
regarding the imposition of economic sanctions against Burma, and 
the Massachusetts Burma Law directly conflicted with the federal 
laws’ strategy.138 
IV. ANALYSIS 
As previously mentioned, the Massachusetts Burma Law marked 
a significant development in the evolution of constituent diplomacy. 
Not only did the Massachusetts Burma Law prevail as the first state 
law of its kind, but, as Part III reveals, the First Circuit’s decision in 
National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios raised various constitu-
tional issues of potentially far reaching significance. Such issues in-
clude, for example, the constitutionality of state selective purchasing 
regulations under the foreign relations effects test established by the 
Supreme Court in Zschernig v. Miller,139 the constitutional relation-
ship and boundaries between federalism and United States foreign 
relations law,140 the applicability of the First and Tenth Amendments 
to foreign relations law,141 the suitability of the market participant 
exception of the dormant Commerce Clause to both the foreign  
 
 
 
 135. See id. 
 136. See id. at 74. 
 137. See id. at 76. 
  138. See id. at 76-77. 
 139. See supra Part III.B.1.a. 
 140. See supra Part III.B.1.a-b. 
 141. See supra Part III.B.1.b. 
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relations effects test142 and the Foreign Commerce Clause,143 and the 
scope of implied federal preemption of state law.144 
Despite the potential significance of these and other unspecified 
issues, this Part will focus exclusively on the First Circuit’s construc-
tion of the relationship and boundaries between federalism and for-
eign affairs law as determined by the court’s interpretation of the 
foreign relations effects test. Specifically, this Part will argue that the 
First Circuit’s formulation of the foreign relations effects test is 
faulty, not only because it fails to provide a definite standard by 
which to measure the constitutionality of constituent diplomacy ac-
tivities like the Massachusetts Burma Law, but also because it fails to 
take into account the manner in which various post–Zschernig inter-
national, technological, and constitutional developments have af-
fected the relationship between federalism and foreign affairs. This 
Part will then explore several possible formulations of the foreign re-
lations effects test, ultimately arguing that the First Circuit should 
have construed the test as an intermediate balancing test similar to 
the one proposed by Massachusetts in Natsios. 
A. Problems with the First Circuit’s Formulation of the Foreign 
Relations Effects Test in National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios 
The First Circuit’s construction of the foreign relations effects 
test in Natsios suffers from four flaws. First, the court’s formulation 
of the test fails to clearly define the test’s criteria and limits, thereby 
continuing the imprecision and ambiguity that characterizes the 
Zschernig court’s original conception of the test as well as existing ju-
risprudence regarding subnational involvement in foreign affairs. 
Second, the court’s interpretation of the test departs from the 
Zschernig court’s focus on application of the subnational regulation 
rather than the facial validity of the law. Third, the high level of gen-
erality used by the First Circuit in its construction of the test pro-
motes federal exclusivity over foreign affairs at the expense of subna-
tional involvement. Fourth, the First Circuit’s approach fails to take 
into account the consequences of significant post–Zschernig devel-
opments in federal constitutional law, international relations, and 
global interdependence. 
 
 142. See supra Part III.B.1.b. 
 143. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 144. See supra Part III.B.3. 
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1. The court’s failure to clearly define the test 
The primary, if not most noticeable, defect of the First Circuit’s 
formulation of the foreign relations effects test in Natsios is the 
court’s failure to plainly articulate the test’s criteria and standards. 
Though the First Circuit’s approach to the effects test parallels that 
of the Zschernig court, the absence of definite standards and guide-
lines undermines the opinion’s precedential value and perpetuates 
the ambiguity that has troubled federal courts’ understanding of the 
relationship between federalism and foreign affairs since the Supreme 
Court’s 1968 decision in Zschernig. 
To its credit, the First Circuit did not receive much guidance 
from the Zschernig opinion regarding how to frame the foreign rela-
tions effects test. As originally presented in Zschernig, the foreign re-
lations effects test consisted of a broad, case-by-case examination of 
whether a particular subnational entity’s act impermissibly imposed 
on the federal government’s authority over the nation’s foreign af-
fairs.145 Zschernig thus presented the effects test as a factually specific, 
general framework with no definite criteria or standards.146 
In Natsios, the First Circuit attempted to follow the Zschernig 
court’s general, fact-specific approach to the effects test. For exam-
ple, the First Circuit correctly and clearly stated the effect’s test’s 
central question—whether the act in question “‘has more than an 
“indirect or incidental effect in foreign countries,”’ and has a ‘“great 
potential for disruption or embarrassment”’”147—and conforms with 
the Zschernig court’s approach of identifying factual factors that pre-
sumably demonstrate the invalidity of the act under the effects 
test.148 Also, the First Circuit clearly characterized the effects test’s 
underlying “principle that there is a threshold level of involvement in 
and impact on foreign affairs which the states may not exceed.”149 
Moreover, the court’s application of the test surpasses that of the dis-
trict court by citing five as opposed to only two factors that, when 
 
 145. See supra Part II.D. 
 146. See id. 
 147. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 51 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. 
granted, Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999) (quot-
ing Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1968)). 
 148. As previously noted, the only category of factor that appeared in the findings of 
both the Natsios and the Zschernig analyses involved the existence of foreign countries’ objec-
tions to the law at issue. See supra Part III.B.1.a. 
 149. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 52. 
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combined, indicate that the Massachusetts Burma Law had a direct 
effect on foreign relations.150 
In the end, however, these measures serve only to restate the for-
eign relations effects test’s outer framework rather than thoroughly 
delineating the framework’s scope or requirements. For example, the 
court’s discussion of the “threshold level of [subnational] involve-
ment in and impact on foreign affairs” never identifies the dividing 
line separating permissible and impermissible acts.151 Similarly, in its 
examination of the various factors that presumably demonstrate the 
Massachusetts Burma Law’s impermissible status under the effects 
test, the court fails to explain its criteria for selecting such factors and 
whether there exist any limits on what type of factors may or may 
not be considered in such an analysis.152 Moreover, the court does 
not attempt to explain or justify why four of the five factors it identi-
fies to demonstrate the Massachusetts Burma Law’s invalidity differ 
in nature from those used by the Zschernig court.153 
The First Circuit’s formulation of the foreign relations effects test 
thus does little more than restate the test’s outer framework and un-
derlying principles, leaving undefined the framework’s definite scope 
and requirements. To be sure, the First Circuit is not alone it its fail-
ure to clearly define the effects test’s parameters and minimum stan-
dards; the same flaw can be found in both the Supreme Court’s 
original formulation of the test in Zschernig154 and the Massachusetts 
 
 
 
 150. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (listing five factors identified by the First 
Circuit as evidence of the Massachusetts Burma Law’s direct effect on foreign relations); Na-
tional Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 291 (1998) (identifying two fac-
tors that caused the Massachusetts Burma Law to impermissibly impinge on federal power over 
foreign affairs: the law’s purpose of furthering democratic reforms in Burma and the fact that 
the European Union, Japan, and the Association of the South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
had formally informed the World Trade Organization and the United States government of 
their opposition to the law). 
 151. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 52-53. 
 152. See id. at 53-54. 
 153. See id. at 53. As previously noted, the only factor common to the analyses of both 
the Natsios and the Zschernig courts involved the existence of foreign countries’ objections to 
the law at issue. See supra Part III.B.1.a. 
 154. See supra Part II.D. Somewhat ironically, the First Circuit noted the flaws with the 
Supreme Court’s formulation of the effects test when it observed that “[t]he precise bounda-
ries of the Supreme Court’s [articulation of the effects test] in Zschernig are unclear.” Natsios, 
181 F.3d at 51-52 (footnote omitted). 
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district court’s subsequent interpretation of the test in the trial court 
proceedings of Natsios.155 
The absence of such definite boundaries and standards under-
mines the First Circuit’s holding regarding the invalidity of the Mas-
sachusetts Burma Law in two primary ways. First, due to the lack of 
definite criteria and standards, the court’s holding appears to be ex-
tremely fact-specific, if not based on the court’s opinion rather than 
established legal principles. Such flaws undermine the opinion’s pre-
cedential value by limiting its applicability to a situation with similar 
factual circumstances and rendering suspect the legitimacy of the 
court’s reasoning. 
More importantly, the decision’s lack of clearly defined require-
ments preserves the ambiguity and vagueness of the relationship be-
tween federalism and foreign affairs that has plagued federal juris-
prudence since the Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Zschernig.156 
Consequently, the decision perpetuates the very real risk of inconsis-
tent judicial conclusions regarding which state actions unlawfully en-
croach on the federal government’s foreign affairs power. Therefore, 
if nothing else, the First Circuit’s failure in Natsios to clearly define 
the criteria and standards applicable to the foreign relations effects 
test renders the court’s decision another “missed . . . opportunity to 
clarify current jurisprudence regarding state involvement in foreign 
affairs.”157 
2. The court’s departure from Zschernig’s application-oriented focus 
Another significant flaw in the First Circuit’s formulation of the 
foreign relations effects test involves the court’s departure from the 
Zschernig court’s focus on the validity of the application of a subna-
tional act rather than the act’s facial validity. As two commentators 
recently observed, “[o]ne fact about Zschernig that is often over-
looked is that the Court only held the Oregon law unconstitutional 
as applied,”158 and they distinguished the case from the Court’s pre-
vious decision, Clark v. Allen,159 where the Court had upheld a simi-
 
 155. See supra note 18. 
 156. For a brief discussion of the ambiguity in federal jurisprudence regarding the rela-
tionship between federalism and foreign affairs, see supra Part II.D. 
 157. Recent Cases, supra note 18, at 2014. 
 158. Loschin & Anderson, supra note 20, at 403. 
 159. 331 U.S. 503 (1947). 
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lar California statute against a challenge to the statute’s facial valid-
ity.160 The Court’s construction of the foreign relations effects test in 
Zschernig, therefore, focused on the application of the Oregon law 
rather than the law’s facial validity. Indeed, Justice Douglas’s opin-
ion, “full of quotations from previous lower court rulings, seemed 
highly critical of probate judges who were willing to summarily dis-
criminate against Soviet client states. It was not the state’s laws that 
were unconstitutional, but the way judges discriminatorily applied 
them that created the potential international embarrassment.”161 
A close examination of the First Circuit’s construction and dis-
cussion of the foreign relations effects test in Natsios reveals that the 
court deviated from Justice Douglas’ focus on state officials’ applica-
tion of the state law at issue and focused instead on the facial validity 
of the law itself. As previously mentioned, the five factors cited by 
the court as evidence of the Massachusetts Burma Law’s direct effect 
on foreign affairs include (1) the law’s purpose to affect another 
country’s affairs, (2) the fact that Massachusetts’ economic power 
positioned the state so that the law could and has had an effect, (3) 
the possibility that the law’s effects could be amplified if other subna-
tional entities enacted similar regulations, (4) the fact that several 
foreign countries and regional organizations had protested the law, 
and (5) the fact that the law deviated from the federal Burma law in 
several ways.162 Conspicuously absent from the court’s list are any 
factors that approximate Judge Douglas’s concerns in Zschernig that 
state judges or (under a broader reading of Zschernig) other state of-
ficials may have applied the Massachusetts Burma Law in a discrimi-
natory fashion. Instead, the list appears to emphasize purely facial 
concerns, such as the law’s purpose or motive, as well as its deviation 
from the federal Burma law. 
The First Circuit’s facially-oriented formulation of the foreign re-
lations effects test in Natsios thus remains inconsistent with the Su-
preme Court’s application-oriented focus in Zschernig. Under an ap-
plication-oriented effects test, the First Circuit arguably could have 
held the law unconstitutional if it had found that state officials, in 
fulfilling their duties to enforce the law or maintain the restricted 
purchasing list, had made “ad hoc decisions about foreign govern-
 
 160. See supra Part II.D. 
 161. Loschin & Anderson, supra note 20, at 404 (footnotes omitted). 
 162. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
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ments’ policies and credibility.”163 Regardless of how the court might 
have viewed the Massachusetts Burma Law under such an applica-
tion-oriented construction of the effects test, the fact remains that 
the court’s formulation of the test in Natsios departs from the test’s 
original formulation in Zschernig. 
3. The court’s formulation of the test at a high level of generality 
A third notable defect in the First Circuit’s formulation of the 
foreign relations effects test concerns the court’s construction of the 
test at a high level of generality that effectively bars any substantive 
involvement by subnational actors in foreign affairs. As one commen-
tator recently observed, federal jurisprudence regarding the validity 
of acts of constituent diplomacy under Zschernig can be divided into 
“two different and inconsistent approaches for applying the [foreign 
relations] effects test: formulating the effects inquiry at either a high 
or low level of generality.”164 Significantly, 
[i]nquiries at a high level of generality examine any potential effects 
that the statute could have on U.S. foreign relations. The mere in-
tention of a state to affect a foreign country’s domestic policies, 
when examined from a high level of generality, would be seen as 
potentially affecting foreign affairs because of the possibility that a 
foreign country could react to a state’s commentary. Alternatively, 
when framing the effects question at a low level of generality, 
courts focus on the actual effects a statute has on a foreign coun-
try.165 
“The level of generality that the court applies to [the foreign rela-
tions] effects inquiry is particularly important because”166 it effec-
tively determines the validity of a statute: to date, those courts that 
have employed the effects test “at a high level of generality . . . have 
consequently found the state action in question invalid.”167  
 
 
 163. Loschin & Anderson, supra note 20, at 405 (citation omitted). Loschin and Ander-
son argue that Zschernig’s application-oriented focus on ad hoc decision making by subnational 
officials “does not apply to selective purchasing laws” because “[t]he legislature . . . makes a 
single decision that [the state] will not do business with certain companies” rather than “the 
same type of continuous credibility decisions” deemed impermissible in Zschernig. Id. 
 164. Recent Cases, supra note 18, at 2016. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
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Conversely, those that have applied a low level of generality have 
found the subnational actor’s conduct to be constitutional.168 
In Natsios, the First Circuit followed the approach favored by the 
majority of the courts that have examined the validity of a subna-
tional actor’s actions under Zschernig and framed its formulation of 
the foreign relations effects test at a high level of generality. 169 
Rather than investigating the effects that the Massachusetts Burma 
Law had generated within Burma, the court focused its inquiry on 
the potential effects that the law could have on United States foreign 
relations. Consequently, the court focused on such factual factors as 
the law’s purpose to affect Burma’s internal affairs and the manner in 
which Massachusetts’ economic power positioned the state so that 
the law could exert an effect on Burma.170 
Two principal problems stem from the First Circuit’s formulation 
of the foreign relations effects test at a high level of generality. First, 
as presently framed, the test essentially guarantees that virtually no 
subnational actions will be deemed valid under Zschernig. As one 
commentator observed, “framing the Zschernig effects inquiry at a 
high level of generality makes it nearly impossible to find that the act 
does not affect foreign relations.”171 Though the effects test itself 
states that subnational actors should be allowed some level of in-
volvement in foreign affairs, the fact that a test framed at a high level 
of generality permits courts to focus on factors not pertaining to the 
actual repercussions of a subnational entity’s acts within the target 
state makes it extremely likely, if not impossible, for the court to up-
hold subnational acts. Though such a result is arguably “normatively 
better” because it protects the federal government’s authority over 
foreign affairs from harmful subnational encroachment,172 it also pre-
vents subnational actors from participating in foreign affairs in an era 
when globalization has intermingled local interests and international 
issues in an unprecedented manner.173 
 
 168. See id. at 2017-18. 
 169. See id. at 2016-17 (demonstrating that most cases that have applied the foreign rela-
tions effects test at a high level of generality have declared the subnational actor’s conduct to 
be invalid). 
 170. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 171. Recent Cases, supra note 18, at 2018. 
 172. See id. 
 173. For a more in-depth discussion of globalization and subnational involvement in for-
eign affairs issues, see infra Part IV.A.4.c. 
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More importantly, any formulation of the foreign relations ef-
fects test at a high degree of generality potentially threatens the 
validity of subnational actions normally considered to be distinct 
from foreign affairs. As constitutional scholar Louis Henkin recently 
observed, such a formulation of the effects test “might cast doubts 
on the right of the states to apply their own ‘public policy’ in 
transnational situations.”174 Moreover, “[i]t would presumably 
condemn also ‘sense resolutions’ on foreign policy by state 
legislatures though such resolutions are not law and could not be 
invalidated, and state legislatures presumably cannot be prevented or 
enjoined from adopting them.”175 
Thus, the First Circuit’s construction of the foreign relations ef-
fects test at a high level of generality is flawed for two principal rea-
sons. First, it essentially precludes subnational involvement in foreign 
affairs. Second, it threatens the validity of subnational activities tradi-
tionally deemed outside the scope of foreign affairs and “intended 
primarily to raise public consciousness, stimulate public discussion, 
and persuade or influence the federal government to consider or re-
examine particular policies.”176 
4. The court’s failure to account for post–Zschernig developments in 
U.S. constitutional law, geopolitical relations, and global 
interdependence 
A final defect in the First Circuit’s construction of the foreign re-
lations effects test involves the court’s failure to formulate the test in 
accordance with post–Zschernig developments regarding federal con-
stitutional law, geopolitical relations, and global interdependence. As 
the discussion below demonstrates, despite the fact that these factors 
did not formally figure into the Supreme Court’s formulation or 
analysis of the foreign relations effects test in Zschernig, the principle 
of absolute federal exclusivity over foreign affairs that underlies both 
the Court’s holding and its construction of the effects test cannot be 
fully or accurately understood without them. 
More importantly, however, the manner in which these factors 
have developed and changed since the Court decided Zschernig in 
 
 174. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 164 
(2d ed. 1996). 
 175. Id. at 164 n.∗. 
 176. Id. (endnote omitted). 
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1968 has great significance for the way Zschernig and the foreign re-
lations effects test should be understood and applied today. Specifi-
cally, the changes that have occurred during the past thirty years in 
federalism’s importance in U.S. constitutional law, the development 
of geopolitical relations, and the increase in global interdependence 
indicate that absolute federal exclusivity over foreign affairs is no 
longer warranted, meaning that subnational actors should be permit-
ted increased involvement in foreign affairs. Zschernig and the effects 
test thus should be construed in a way that provides an increased role 
for subnational interests and allows constituent diplomacy greater 
participation in the international arena. 
The First Circuit’s formulation of the foreign relations effects test 
in Natsios is therefore flawed because it continues Zschernig’s narrow 
focus on maintaining absolute federal exclusivity over foreign affairs 
and fails to allow subnational actors greater participation in foreign 
affairs. Consequently, the First Circuit’s approach remains based on 
outdated, if not illegitimate, ideological underpinnings. 
a. The importance of federalism in U.S. constitutional law. Since 
the early twentieth century, U.S. jurisprudence regarding foreign af-
fairs has maintained the general principle that “[p]ower over external 
affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national govern-
ment exclusively.”177 Under this view (which carries such labels as 
the “exclusivity principle”178 or the “twentieth-century view”179), 
“the reserved powers of the states do not limit the federal govern-
ment’s exercise of foreign affairs powers, and states are broadly pro-
hibited from engaging in foreign affairs activities.”180 According to 
the exclusivity principle’s proponents, the virtual exclusion of subna-
 
 177. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (“Our system of government is such that the interest of the cities, counties 
and states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires 
that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interfer-
ence.”); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (“[I]n respect of our foreign 
relations generally, state lines disappear.”). 
 178. Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1224 
(1999). 
 179. Bradley, supra note 62, at 1093. Bradley recognizes federal exclusivity over foreign 
affairs as only one of three elements making up “the twentieth century view” of United States 
foreign affairs. The other two components include the supremacy of the executive branch in 
foreign relations matters, see id. at 1091, and “the notion that federal courts should make law 
when necessary to protect the national government’s prerogatives in foreign affairs,” id. at 
1095. 
 180. Id. at 1093. 
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tional actors from the international relations arena is justifiable, if not 
necessary, because “foreign affairs concern the interests of the entire 
nation and thus are not the province of the constituent states,”181 
and, “[w]ithout constraints on state power, . . . one state will take 
action for which other states or the whole nation will suffer the ad-
verse consequences.”182 Federalism and states rights concerns are 
therefore irrelevant due to the prevailing need for the country to 
“speak with one voice.”183 
Scholar Peter J. Spiro recently observed that the Supreme 
Court’s decision and creation of the foreign relations effects test in 
Zschernig coincided with, and possibly contributed to, “the high 
mark of federal exclusivity.”184 As previously discussed, the Zschernig 
court’s construction of the effects test focused on the Oregon law’s 
potential for “direct[ly] impact[ing] . . . foreign relations and . . . ad-
versely affect[ing] the power of the central government to deal with 
those problems”185 rather than the law’s actual effects within East 
Germany.186 Thus formulated at a high level of generality, the 
Zschernig construction of the effects test established the absolute 
character of federal exclusivity by virtually guaranteeing that any 
subnational act would be struck down as violating the federal gov-
ernment’s authority over foreign affairs.187 Moreover, in framing the 
test, the Court justified federal exclusivity by assuming that the Con-
stitution’s allocation of “certain specific powers regarding foreign af-
fairs to Congress and to the President implies a general federal for-
eign affairs power that is both penumbral (i.e., broader and less 
determinate than the specific foreign affairs power delegated to the 
federal government [by the Constitution]), and dormant (i.e., pre-
clusive of inconsistent state legislation).”188 The Zschernig court’s 
construction of the foreign relations effects test thus established ab-
solute federal exclusivity over foreign affairs, “effectively  
 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. Spiro, supra note 178, at 1225 (footnote omitted). 
 183. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976); see also Japan Line, Ltd. 
v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979). 
 184. Spiro, supra note 178, at 1241. 
 185. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968). 
 186. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. 
 187. See Porterfield, supra note 5, at 10. 
 188. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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abandon[ing] the view that our system of federalism imposes certain 
limits on the federal government’s authority over the states.”189 
In recent years, the continued legitimacy of absolute federal ex-
clusivity in contemporary United States foreign affairs law has been 
indirectly brought into question by the Supreme Court’s “revival of 
federalism restrictions”190 on federal government authority. During 
“the past decade, the Supreme Court has shown a willingness to im-
pose federalism restrictions on the national government, both in the 
form of limitations on the scope of the federal government’s dele-
gated powers and in the form of independent sovereignty restraints 
on the exercise of these powers.”191 For example, in United States v. 
Lopez,192 the Court struck down a national law prohibiting the pos-
session of firearms in school zones, holding that the law exceeded 
congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce under the 
Commerce Clause.193 In support of its decision, the Court empha-
sized the importance of not interpreting the enumerated powers 
granted by the Constitution to the federal government so broadly as 
to destroy the “healthy balance of power between the States and 
Federal Government.”194 Though the Constitution granted Congress 
the authority to regulate interstate commerce, the Court noted that 
the need to protect state control over education from congressional 
intrusion required that Congress’s authority be interpreted narrowly 
so as to not intrude on state sovereignty.195 Federalism’s interest in 
preserving state authority and sovereignty thus required that federal 
authority be construed in a restricted manner. 
Though Lopez and the Court’s other federalism-related deci-
sions196 have occurred primarily in the domestic context, Professor 
 
 189. Id. at 2 (footnote omitted). 
 190. Bradley, supra note 62, at 1100-01 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)). 
 191. Id. at 1100. 
 192. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 193. See id. at 567-68. 
 194. Id. at 552 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)). 
 195. See id. at 566. 
 196. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating, under the 
Tenth Amendment, a federal law directing state and local executive officials to assist in imple-
menting a federal gun control scheme involving background checks of gun purchasers); Bar-
clays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (holding in part that Congress, 
not the courts, possesses the authority to determine whether state autonomy or tax uniformity 
best serves the national interest); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking 
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Curtis A. Bradley noted that the Court’s recent decision in Breard v. 
Greene197 constitutes a “sign that this revival of federalism restric-
tions will indeed spill over to foreign affairs.”198 In Breard, the Court 
declined to grant a stay of execution to a Paraguayan citizen exe-
cuted by the Commonwealth of Virginia in 1998.199 The Court justi-
fied its decision on federalism grounds, affirming that the “preroga-
tive” of whether or not to stay the execution belonged to the state 
governor, not the Court.200 It should be noted that the Court main-
tained its profederalism rationale despite the fact that Virginia offi-
cials’ conduct in arresting Breard violated the requirements of an in-
ternational treaty to which the United States is a party, and the 
International Court of Justice had issued an order requiring the U.S. 
government to delay the execution.201 
So what does the Court’s newfound affinity for federalism mean 
for absolute federal exclusivity in general and the First Circuit’s ap-
proach to the foreign relations effects test in particular? First, it indi-
cates that the principle of absolute federal exclusivity over foreign af-
fairs no longer applies to United States foreign relations law. To be 
sure, “[t]he persistent potential for subfederal action to disrupt na-
tional foreign relations”202 still maintains the necessity for federal su-
premacy over foreign relations. Supremacy, however, is not the same 
as exclusivity and can be construed so as to allow subnational entities 
greater access to, and participation in, the foreign affairs arena. As 
Professor Harold G. Maier asserted, 
The principle of federalism echoes a fundamental principle of de-
mocracy: that governmental decisions made at the local level are 
more likely to reflect the will of the people most directly affected by 
them. As long as the United States continues to exist as a federal 
nation, decisions in cases involving possible state intrusion into for-
eign affairs must continue to strike an appropriate balance between 
 
 
 
down, under the Tenth Amendment, a federal law requiring states to regulate low level radio-
active waste in a manner specified by Congress). 
 197. 523 U.S. 371 (1998). 
 198. Bradley, supra note 62, at 1101. 
 199. 523 U.S. at 378-79. 
 200. See id. 
 201. See Bradley, supra note 62, at 1101. 
 202. Spiro, supra note 178, at 1247. 
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preservation of the values of local self-government and the need for 
national uniformity in matters of international affairs.203 
Federalism, therefore, requires that the principle of federal exclusivity 
be replaced by a more moderate principle of federal supremacy (or 
“limited federal exclusivity”) that allows the federal government to 
have the final say in foreign affairs while simultaneously providing 
subnational entities broader involvement. 
Second, given the illegitimacy of federal exclusivity under feder-
alism, the Supreme Court’s recent revival of federalism means that 
the First Circuit’s formulation of the foreign relations effects test in 
Natsios must be considered defective to the degree it perpetuates 
federal exclusivity and unduly prohibits subnational involvement in 
foreign affairs. A careful examination of the First Circuit’s formula-
tion of the test indicates that the test fails under this rationale. As 
previously demonstrated, the First Circuit’s construction of the test 
at a high level of generality vigorously and effectively promotes fed-
eral exclusivity by prohibiting virtually all subnational participation in 
foreign affairs.204 The First Circuit’s construction of the foreign rela-
tions effects test in Natsios, therefore, is flawed because its vigorous 
promotion of federal exclusivity over foreign affairs fails to account 
for the Supreme Court’s recent revival of federalism as a limit on 
federal authority. 
b. Geopolitical relations and the end of the Cold War. In general, 
scholars and commentators agree that both the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Zschernig and its formulation of the foreign relations effects 
test should be understood as “a judicial reaction to a state’s contri-
butions to the Cold War.”205 According to this view, the highly po-
larized international climate and very real potential for retaliation 
that accompanied the U.S.-Soviet geopolitical rivalry necessitated the 
 
 203. Maier, supra note 82, at 837. 
 204. See supra Part IV.A.3. 
 205. HENKIN, supra note 174, at 165. See also Goldsmith, supra note 79, at 1408-09 
(asserting that the Court’s establishment of the foreign relations effects test during the Cold 
War made sense due in part to the flexibility and control that the test offered to the judiciary); 
Spiro, supra note 178, at 1242 (“[Zschernig] seems both explained and justified (at least at the 
time) by its Cold War context.”); Carvajal, supra note 20, at 268 (asserting that “[b]ecause . . . 
Zschernig [was] decided in the midst of . . . the Cold War, . . . the Court was concerned pri-
marily with the international consequences of angering a foreign nation”). But see Denning & 
McCall, supra note 20, at 323 n.83 (labeling the statement that Zschernig “should be read 
against, and limited by, a Cold War backdrop” as “a non sequitur” and arguing that 
“[c]oncerns with state conduct of foreign policy predated the Cold War”). 
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extreme variety of federal exclusivity over United States foreign af-
fairs promoted by the Court’s formulation of the foreign relations 
effects test in Zschernig.206 As Professor Spiro observed, 
In the tinderbox world of superpower competition, the potential 
consequences of giving offense were obviously profound. One 
could not expect the Soviets necessarily to understand that when a 
state official spoke, it was not for the nation; or at least one would 
not want to risk error in assessing that perception. At the very least, 
there was the specter of state action upsetting the elaborately cho-
reographed relationship between East and West Blocs; at worst, 
one could plausibly draw a scenario in which offense caused by 
state action lit the fuse to World War III. Nor against this backdrop 
could one rely on the political branches to beat back state action 
before the damage was done; the context, in other words, sup-
ported the strict application of a dormant federal power.207 
The Cold War period thus “represented a justifiable zenith for the 
exclusivity” of federal power over foreign affairs.208 
Against this background that emphasized the need for federal ex-
clusivity over foreign affairs, “[t]he rise of the foreign relations ef-
fects test . . . ma[de] sense.”209 As articulated by the Court in Zscher-
nig, the effects test sought to protect against “the dangers which are 
involved if each State . . . is permitted to establish its own foreign 
policy”210 by establishing the superiority of federal control over for-
eign affairs in all instances where state action could arguably affect 
the nation’s foreign relations in a direct manner.211 According to 
Professor Jack L. Goldsmith, the effects test’s case-by-case approach 
likely appealed to the Court due to the fact that “any errors of un-
der- or overinclusiveness [that might have resulted from a rule-like 
approach] were thought to be unacceptably costly in the Cold War 
world.”212 Moreover, the “effects test might have seemed to allow 
the Court more flexibility in avoiding costly foreign relations errors 
 
 
 206. See Spiro, supra note 178, at 1227-28. For a brief discussion on federal exclusivity 
and the Zschernig court’s construction of the foreign relations effects test, see id. at 1231-32. 
 207. Spiro, supra note 178, at 1242 (footnotes omitted). 
 208. Id. at 1228. 
 209. Goldsmith, supra note 79, at 1409. 
 210. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968). 
 211. See id. 
 212. Goldsmith, supra note 79, at 1409. 
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and in shaping its judgments to the wishes of the Executive in cri-
sis.”213 
Regardless of the precise reasons why the Court adopted the for-
eign relations effects test in Zschernig, the need for strict federal ex-
clusivity ended with the conclusion of the Cold War in the early 
1990s. Simply put, the end of the Cold War thus signaled “a re-
duced need for the national government to speak with one voice in 
international relations.”214 As Professor Goldsmith observed, 
It was plausible to think in 1964—less than two years after the Cu-
ban missile crisis—that the adjudication of a Cuban expropriation 
of American property might produce a foreign relations crisis that 
literally threatened the nation’s existence. It is easy to understand a 
similar reaction to Oregon’s retaliatory legislation against East Ger-
many in 1968. When formally analogous situations arise in our 
post–Cold War world—for example, when a court adjudicates the 
validity of a Russian act of state, or when Massachusetts sanctions 
[Burma] for human rights violations—the consequences for U.S. 
foreign relations and for the survival of the nation cannot be com-
pared to the Cold War period. They are from any perspective much 
less significant.215 
The conclusion of the Cold War thus discontinued the need for fed-
eral exclusivity over foreign affairs. 216 Moreover, without a need for 
federal exclusivity, the end of the Cold War indicated the demise of 
Zschernig and its broad formulation of the foreign relations effects 
test, leading one scholar to surmise that “[o]ne would be bold to 
predict that [Zschernig] has a future life; might it remain on the Su-
preme Court’s pages, a relic of the Cold War?”217 
Thus, any broad, Zschernig-like post–Cold War formulation of 
the foreign relations effects test must be considered defective to the 
degree it promotes federal exclusivity. Under this reasoning, the First 
Circuit’s construction of the effects test in Natsios once again should 
be considered flawed because its high level of generality effectively 
 
 
 213. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 214. Bradley, supra note 62, at 1105. 
 215. Goldsmith, supra note 79, at 1412 (footnotes omitted). 
 216. See Spiro, supra note 178, at 1247 (“[P]erhaps the best argument for softening the 
rule of federal exclusivity highlights the end of the Cold War and the diminished ultimate dan-
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 217. HENKIN, supra note 174, at 165 n.∗∗. 
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promotes federal exclusivity by prohibiting virtually all subnational 
participation in foreign affairs.218 
c. The growth of global interdependence. Since early twentieth cen-
tury, the principle of federal exclusivity over foreign affairs has 
“rested on the proposition that . . . the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ af-
fairs of the United States were essentially different.”219 As G. Edward 
White observed, Americans have perceived the relatively peaceful 
state of domestic politics to be fundamentally different from the 
unstable world of international geopolitics whose sovereign actors 
[have] seemed to behave in incomprehensible but threatening 
ways. Policymaking in that realm [has] seemed to bear little rela-
tionship to policymaking in the still peaceful, democratic, capitalist 
American domestic arena. As such, foreign relations policymaking 
[has] appeared to be a natural province of specialists who [can] re-
spond to internationally generated threats to American security 
with swift and flexible diplomatic or military actions.220 
Federal exclusivity, therefore, has resulted from the perception that 
the federal government, rather than any state or subnational actor, 
possesses the knowledge, skill, and capacity to properly confront and 
deal with the “alien, delicate, and dangerous” international arena.221 
Notably, the manner in which global interdependence has 
evolved and grown in the decades since the Supreme Court decided 
Zschernig has greatly undermined, if not abolished, the validity of 
these arguments in support of federal exclusivity. Specifically, the dis-
tinction between domestic and foreign affairs has eroded in an un-
precedented fashion in recent years due to three general develop-
ments. First, there no longer exists a “rigid separation between 
foreign and domestic affairs”;222 rather, they have become inter-
twined into “‘intermestic’ affairs.”223 For example, issues such as 
“trade, investment, tourism, immigration, drug trafficking, . . . cor-
porate chartering, crime control, public health and welfare, land use, 
labor relations, and the regulation of banking, insurance, telecom-
 
 218. See supra Part IV.A.3. 
 219. G. Edward White, Observations on the Turning of Foreign Affairs Jurisprudence, 70 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1114 (1999) (citing GEORGE SUTHERLAND, THE INTERNAL AND 
EXTERNAL POWERS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, S. DOC. NO. 61-417 (2d Sess. 1909)). 
 220. Id. at 1121. 
 221. Id. at 1122. 
 222. Kincaid, supra note 21, at 121. 
 223. Id. (citation omitted). 
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munications, professional activity, wildlife, and the environment”224 
all have become significant domestically as well as internationally. 
Moreover, traditionally “foreign” and “domestic” areas of law have 
become “domesticized” (or “internationalized,” depending on one’s 
point of view) as “the scope of international law has broadened sub-
stantially, both covering many areas that were formerly regulated 
only by domestic law and governing the rights and duties not only of 
nation-states, but also of individuals.”225 
Second, in addition to participating in many “international” ac-
tivities that require little or no experience or expertise, 226 subnational 
actors have become increasingly more familiar with international is-
sues and foreign practices as they have participated in the interna-
tional arena. Most subnational entities “have experienced the new 
interdependence quite directly, and it reaches into virtually every sec-
tor of [subnational] life.”227 In addition, as subnational entities have 
dealt with similar foreign entities, they have opened new “channels 
of contact across national boundaries,” thereby facilitating a new and 
deeper “understanding of the internal allocation of authorities in 
other nations.”228 
Third, subnational entities and their constituencies (the infamous 
“public”) have become better equipped to participate in traditionally 
“international” matters as technological advances have made relevant 
information increasingly more timely, more accessible, and less costly 
to obtain. As one commentator affirmed, 
From the technological advances in communications alone, Ameri-
cans have access to massive amounts of timely information, and in-
deed can monitor diplomatic events visually. While the public may, 
with good reason, be denied access to certain data because of its 
sensitivity, the willing citizen or group can become sufficiently 
versed in matters that are or should be unclassified to make  
 
 
 
 224. Id. 
 225. Bradley, supra note 62, at 1105 (footnote omitted). 
 226. See Bilder, supra note 57, at 123 (“[T]he kinds of international matters and issues 
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educated judgments about the basic substance of most foreign af-
fairs problems.229 
Made in 1976, only eight years after the Court’s decision in Zscher-
nig, these statements have become much more pertinent thanks to 
recent communications-related technological developments involv-
ing computers, the Internet, more sophisticated communications 
satellites, and other similar technology. Due to such developments in 
communications technology, the “metaphor of the global village, a 
place where incidental, even random international contacts are rou-
tine” has become reality for many, if not most Americans.230 
Together, these three factors indicate that the traditional “exter-
nal/internal” rationale supporting federal exclusivity over federal af-
fairs no longer applies to United States foreign affairs law and that, 
by extension, federal exclusivity ranks as an illegitimate objective. 
Also, these factors strongly suggest that constituent diplomacy ef-
forts should be permitted greater involvement in the international 
arena because subnational groups now possess the experience, con-
tacts, and information to make proper decisions and act responsibly. 
Admittedly, this does not mean that states should be granted free 
reign; as previously mentioned, there still exists some need for na-
tional uniformity in foreign affairs. Nevertheless, these factors indi-
cate that any doctrine that supports federal exclusivity and severely 
limits subnational participation in foreign affairs, such as the First 
Circuit’s construction of the foreign relations affairs test, should be 
considered outdated or even invalid. 
d. Summary and conclusion. The final flaw in the First Circuit’s 
formulation of the foreign relations effects test in Natsios concerns 
the court’s failure to adequately account for post–Zschernig devel-
opments in U.S. constitutional law, geopolitical relations, and global 
interdependence, and their effect on the legitimacy of the federal ex-
clusivity principle. Both individually and collectively, the Supreme 
Court’s recent commitment to federalism, the end of the Cold War, 
and the ever-increasing phenomenon of global interdependence sup-
 
 229. Richard A. Frank, Public Participation in the Foreign Policy Process, in THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY: AN INQUIRY BY A PANEL OF THE 
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 66, 71 (Francis O. Wilcox & Richard A. Frank 
eds., 1976). Frank suggested increased public involvement through such means as administra-
tive proceedings, advisory committees and delegations, and public congressional hearings 
rather than constituent diplomacy. See id. at 74-81. 
 230. White, supra note 219, at 1122-23. 
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port the proposition that federal exclusivity over foreign affairs is no 
longer a desirable or legitimate principle. Accordingly, these factors 
indicate that Zschernig and its foreign relations effects test should be 
construed narrowly to prevent federal exclusivity while providing an 
increased role for subnational interests and allowing constituent di-
plomacy greater participation in the international arena. Unfortu-
nately for the First Circuit, its formulation of the effects test in 
Natsios must be considered defective under the above rationale be-
cause the test employs a high level of generality that promotes fed-
eral exclusivity and severely restricts subnational involvement in for-
eign affairs, and it fails to account for the pro-constituent diplomacy 
principles established by the post–Zschernig developments discussed 
above. 
B. Options on Review: Proposed Approaches and the Appeal of a 
Limited Balancing Test 
Given the First Circuit’s flawed formulation of the foreign rela-
tions effects test in National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, what 
approach should the courts adopt in the future to achieve a permissi-
ble construction of the test? Admittedly, the question of how the ef-
fects test should be framed is not easily answered and has been the 
subject of much scholarly commentary and debate ever since the Su-
preme Court first ambiguously articulated the test in Zschernig v. 
Miller.231 However, a close review of the lessons derived from the 
First Circuit’s defective approach in Natsios and the strengths and 
weaknesses of several potential approaches suggests that the most 
suitable construction of the effects inquiry would be a limited balanc-
ing test similar to the three-part analysis suggested by Harold G. 
Maier. 
 
 
 231. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. 
L. REV. 1617, 1699-711 (1997) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of categorical 
rules, executive suggestion, and motive review, and concluding that the foreign relations effects 
test should be abandoned); HENKIN, supra note 174, at 164 (listing different possible ap-
proaches to, and formulations of, the effects test); Maier, supra, note 82, at 838-39 (suggest-
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1. Lessons from Natsios 
As an example of a defective construction of the foreign relations 
effects test, the First Circuit’s formulation of the test in Natsios illus-
trates several requirements that any construction of the test must fol-
low. First, a proposed formulation of the test should clearly set forth 
the test’s requirements and scope, not just its outer framework.232 In 
other words, the test needs to distinctly explain the threshold sepa-
rating permissible and impermissible subnational acts, identify its 
minimum standards, and define the criteria that will be considered in 
its analysis. As previously demonstrated, failure to take such steps af-
fects the apparent legitimacy of a court’s holding by both making the 
court’s test appear to be based on opinion rather than established le-
gal principles and perpetuating the real risk of inconsistent judicial 
conclusions regarding the types of subnational actions that should be 
considered permissible.233 
Second, a proposed test should focus on the validity of the appli-
cation of a subnational act rather than the act’s facial validity.234 A fa-
cial inquiry remains inconsistent with the application-oriented ap-
proach adopted by the Supreme Court in Zschernig. 
Third, a proposed formulation of the test should not be framed 
at a high degree of generality.235 Again, this simply means that a test 
should analyze the actual effects of the subnational action in ques-
tion within a particular country rather than the potential effects that 
the law could have on United States foreign relations. 
Finally, a proposed construction of the test should not directly or 
indirectly promote federal exclusivity over foreign affairs.236 Such a 
result or objective remains clearly inconsistent with post–Zschernig 
developments in U.S. constitutional law, global geopolitical rela-
tions, and global interdependence.237 
In conclusion, it should be remembered that any proposed for-
mulation of the foreign relations effects test must satisfy all of the 
above requirements. Failure to fulfill any of them will render the 
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proposed approach to the test markedly less effective, if not defec-
tive. 
2. Strengths and weaknesses of proposed approaches 
As previously mentioned, scholars and commentators have sug-
gested numerous possible constructions of the foreign relations ef-
fects test. Examples of proposed approaches include framing the test 
as categorical rules,238 allowing the executive branch to prescribe 
which subnational activities should be considered impermissible,239 
asking whether a subnational action requires a subnational actor to 
“sit in judgment” on a foreign government’s policies or practices,240 
examining the motive of a subnational activity to determine whether 
it intends to affect a foreign government’s domestic agenda,241 and 
balancing federal and subnational interests to determine whether a 
particular subnational activity discriminates against or unduly bur-
dens the federal government’s conduct of foreign relations.242 
Though most of these suggested approaches provide a readily 
workable formula, a brief examination of them reveals that all are un-
acceptable due to their failure to satisfy the Natsios requirements or 
some other internal defect or inconsistency. 
a. Categorical rules. One relatively common proposed approach 
to the foreign relations effects test involves framing the test as rules 
that categorically define what types of subnational actions constitute 
permissible acts with indirect effects. One commentator, for exam-
ple, suggested that subnational actions be considered to have direct 
effects on foreign affairs (and therefore to be impermissible) “in only 
three types of cases”: (1) when the subnational action involves “any 
matter that requires a prior decision about what counts as a foreign 
state,”243 (2) when the subnational action subjects “a foreign state’s 
public policy . . . to formal judicial evaluation,”244 and (3) when the 
subnational action involves “immigration matters.”245 This approach, 
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he argued, “makes sense as a matter of principle”246 because it gives 
subnational entities authority over categories that “fail to implicate a 
federal interest”247 while preserving federal authority over more sen-
sitive and problematic issues.248 
In an era when there exists pressure for the courts to draw bright 
lines around acceptable and unacceptable conduct, the proposal to 
frame the effects test as categorical rules has great appeal. Not only 
would categorical rules be justiciably manageable, they would also 
present subnational entities and their respective constituencies with 
advance knowledge of the varieties of diplomatic activities in which 
they may participate. Furthermore, a categorical approach would be 
able “to make wider, and hopefully more informed, predictions 
about the aims of the political branches” than does case-by-case 
analysis under a broader standard.249 
Unfortunately, the benefits that might accrue from a categorical 
approach do not outweigh “the fundamental problem of deciding 
which narrowly defined categories warrant judicial preemption.”250 
The process of determining which actions should be classified in 
which category remains open to various criticisms and problems: 
“the uncertain need for such law, [the] courts’ relative incompetence 
to choose the appropriate category of preemption and the content of 
this law, [the] asymmetry in political branch incentives to revise judi-
cial errors,” to name a few.251 Also, categories “are bound to be 
over- and underinclusive with respect to the purposes of the foreign 
relations doctrines.”252 Moreover, “as the scope of [constituent di-
plomacy activities] expands to include nontraditional [subnational] 
foreign relations activities that require more fine-grained contextual 
assessments, a rule-based approach will be much harder to craft, and 
error costs of any such rule will likely be significant.”253 
Thus, despite a categorical approach’s appeal and potential bene-
fits as a method of creating bright-line rules, it must be deemed an 
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unacceptable formulation of the foreign relations effects test due to 
its internal flaws and difficulties. 
b. Executive suggestion. Another proposed approach to formulat-
ing the foreign relations effects test entails treating all subnational ac-
tivities that violate boundaries suggested by the executive branch as 
having a direct effect on foreign affairs.254 According to this ap-
proach, the executive branch should be permitted to officially pre-
scribe to the courts what types of subnational actions ought to be 
prohibited.255 The executive branch’s recommendation, therefore, 
“would constitute case-specific federal law binding on courts.”256 
On one hand, the “executive suggestion”257 approach appears to 
offer a more professional approach to defining the line between im-
permissible and permissible subnational involvement in foreign af-
fairs. Unlike the judicial branch, the executive possesses “the exper-
tise, the democratic accountability, and the centralized decision-
making capabilities”258 to formulate effective and proper boundaries 
for subnational actors’ participation in the international arena. 
On the other hand, the executive suggestion approach contains 
several fatal flaws. For example, the executive branch lacks the consti-
tutional authority to engage in this sort of lawmaking, and it seems 
unlikely that Congress would delegate such authority.259 Similarly, 
“case-specific federal lawmaking without notice, opportunity to be 
heard, or appellate review does violence to basic notions of due 
process.”260 Finally, granting the executive branch the authority and 
responsibility to determine the scope of permitted subnational for-
eign affairs-related activities would almost certainly weigh down the 
executive’s other responsibilities by consuming important resources 
 
 254. See id. It should be noted that Professor Goldsmith’s focus and description of this 
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and politicizing previously nonpolitical issues.261 Therefore, the ex-
ecutive suggestion approach to construing the foreign relations ef-
fects test should also be avoided due to internal defects and weak-
nesses. 
c. Sitting in judgment. The “sitting in judgment” approach con-
stitutes a third possible manner of framing the foreign relations ef-
fects test. Under this approach, subnational activities are considered 
to have impermissible direct effects on foreign relations if they re-
quire subnational officials to “sit in judgment” on foreign govern-
ments’ policies and practices.262 Notably, the Supreme Court’s con-
struction of the effects test in Zschernig heavily incorporated this 
approach into its general framework.263 
At first glance, this approach appears to offer a straightforward, 
judicially manageable method of defining permissible subnational 
participation in foreign affairs. Upon closer inspection, however, the 
sitting in judgment formula also suffers from a significant internal in-
consistency. Simply put, prohibiting subnational actors from sitting 
in judgment on foreign nations’ policies and practices in the foreign 
affairs context directly conflicts with their ability to engage in such 
conduct in other contexts. For example, in their respective concur-
ring and dissenting opinions in Zschernig v. Miller,264 Justices Harlan 
and White objected to the majority’s application of the “sitting in 
judgment” standard to invalidate the Oregon law because states were 
authorized to make critical judgments of foreign nations in other 
contexts.265 As Justice Harlan stated: 
[T]he Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act pro-
vides that a foreign-country money judgment shall not be recog-
nized if it “was rendered under a system which does not provide 
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements 
of due process of law.” When there is a dispute as to the content of 
foreign law, the court is required under the common law to treat 
the question as one of fact and to consider any evidence presented 
as to the actual administration of the foreign legal system. And in 
the field of choice of law there is a nonstatutory rule that the tort 
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law of a foreign country will not be applied if that country is shown 
to be “uncivilized.”266 
“Surely,” Justice Harlan concluded, “all of these rules possess the 
same ‘defect’ as the [Oregon] statute now before us. Yet I assume 
that the Court would not find them unconstitutional.”267 
As Louis Henkin points out, a similar contextual inconsistency 
exists with respect to a Florida state statute.268 The Florida Territorial 
Waters Act of 1963 required aliens to receive a license to fish in the 
state’s territorial waters, but it denied such licenses to vessels owned 
by Communist states, “an alien Communist, . . . [and] other alien 
vessels ‘on the basis of reciprocity or retorsion’ unless the State De-
partment transmitted a formal suggestion that the state of the vessel 
[was] a friendly ally or neutral.”269 In a case tried under the Act, the 
court sustained the Act despite the fact that it required state officials 
to “sit in judgment” on foreign governments in the process of de-
termining whether to award a license to a Communist- or alien-
owned vessel.270 
The “sitting in judgment” approach to construing the foreign re-
lations effects test thus should be considered defective because its 
prohibitions on subnational actors’ ability to judge foreign nations’ 
policies and practices in the foreign affairs context directly conflicts 
with their ability to engage in such conduct in other contexts. 
d. Motive review. A notable element of the First Circuit’s formu-
lation of the foreign relations effects test in Natsios, the motive re-
view approach asks whether “the design and intent of [a particular 
subnational action] is to affect the affairs of a foreign country.”271 If 
found to have such a purpose, the action would be deemed to have a 
direct effect on foreign affairs, thereby rendering it impermissible. 
Like several of the other approaches already presented, the im-
permissible purpose or motive approach offers the advantage of be-
ing easily administered by the courts.272 Moreover, the motive ap-
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proach potentially narrows the scope of subnational activities subject 
to proscription because most subnational acts “are facially neutral 
and were not designed with the purpose of influencing U.S. foreign 
relations.”273 
Regardless of these potential benefits, however, the motive re-
view approach suffers from several significant defects that render it 
unserviceable in this context. First, motive review fails to satisfy the 
requirements derived from the First Circuit’s formulation of the ef-
fects test in Natsios. Contrary to those requirements,274 motive re-
view focuses on the facial validity of a subnational regulation rather 
than the subnational actor’s application of the regulation. Moreover, 
motive review that focuses on a regulation’s effects due to the pres-
ence of facial neutrality involves an inquiry made at a high level of 
generality, a type of inquiry prohibited by the requirements.275 
Second, the courts do not always favor employing motive review. 
Though an impermissible motive may be obvious in some instances, 
it is frequently not in others.276 Consequently, the courts “ha[ve] 
been reluctant to probe legislative purpose” in other contexts.277 
Motive review thus prevails as a flawed rather than beneficial ap-
proach to formulating the foreign relations effects test due to its fail-
ure to comply with the “Natsios requirements” as well as its own in-
ternal defects. 
e. Balancing federal and state interests. In Natsios, the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts urged the court to adopt a fifth possible 
approach to the foreign relations effects test: “balance the nation’s 
interests in a unified foreign policy against the particular interests of 
an individual state.”278 Under such a balancing test, subnational ac-
tions would be permitted where the subnational interest underlying 
the action outweighed the national interest in maintaining a unified 
foreign policy. 
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The balancing approach proposed by Massachusetts presents sev-
eral advantages that, at least initially, support its adoption. For ex-
ample, a balancing test theoretically would allow subnational actors 
to participate in international activities in which they have a direct 
and substantial interest, while reserving those areas in which subna-
tional interest is not as strong to federal control. Also, the U.S. judi-
ciary is familiar with using balancing tests and currently employs such 
tests to decide such complex issues as the applicability of the dor-
mant Commerce Clause279 and, as Justice Scalia has noted,280 the 
constitutionality of state acts that affect individual liberties.281 
Despite these apparent advantages, Massachusetts’ balancing ap-
proach ultimately fails for several important reasons. First, as the First 
Circuit correctly determined in Natsios, the Supreme Court’s con-
struction of the foreign relations effects test remains incompatible 
with balancing state and national interests. Rather than permitting 
such balancing, the First Circuit observed, “Zschernig stands for the 
principle that there is a threshold level of involvement in and impact 
on foreign affairs which the states may not exceed.”282 
Second, as Justice Scalia noted in the dormant Commerce Clause 
context, the balancing of subnational and federal interests “is not 
really appropriate, since the interests on both sides are incommensu-
rate. It is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a 
particular rock is heavy.”283 Notably, this disparate and noncompa-
rable relationship also exists between subnational interests in partici-
pating in the international arena and the federal interest in promot-
ing national uniformity in foreign policy. 
Third, though the courts may “make . . . ‘balancing’ judgments 
in determining how far the needs of the State can intrude upon the 
liberties of the individual,”284 inquiries that involve balancing subna-
tional and federal interests relating to foreign affairs are, similar to 
the dormant Commerce Clause analysis, “ill suited to the judicial  
 
 
 279. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 280. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
 281. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988). 
 282. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 52. 
 283. Bendix Autolite Corp., 486 U.S. at 897 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
 284. Id. (citation omitted). 
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function and should be undertaken rarely if at all.”285 By nature, is-
sues relating to foreign affairs are political and thus should be re-
solved by political processes. This seems to be the central message of 
the Supreme Court’s statement in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise 
Tax Board:286 “Congress—whose voice . . . is the Nation’s—[has the 
responsibility] to evaluate whether the national interest is best served 
by tax uniformity, or state autonomy.”287 Regardless of the interna-
tionally-oriented course of action taken by a subnational entity, 
Congress has the discretion to preempt that action as well as the ex-
perience in weighing disparate state and federal interests in political 
issues. Balancing state and federal interests in foreign affairs generally 
should be left to Congress rather than the courts. 
Fourth, the fact that a balancing test would require courts to 
weigh individual state interests as they arose on a case-by-case basis 
violates the Natsios requirement that the foreign relations effects test 
be framed definitely and in a rule-like manner. As Justice Scalia 
noted in the dormant Commerce Clause context, such methodology 
lacks predictability, particularly in respect to issues that remain to be 
decided.288 Thus, due to the fact that a balancing test by nature re-
quires case-by-case analysis and gives little instruction as to how a 
particular issue should be decided, the proposed balancing test fails 
to meet the criteria established through the above critique of Natsios. 
Massachusetts’ suggestion that the foreign relations effects test be 
framed as a pure balancing test thus fails due to internal inconsisten-
cies and defects. 
3. A proposal with potential: the Maier limited balancing test 
As the preceding discussion indicates, the majority of proposed 
formulations of the foreign relations effects test should be considered 
flawed because they either violate the requirements derived from the 
First Circuit’s defective construction of the effects test in Natsios or 
suffer from a separate, internal failing. Significantly, however, there 
exists one promising proposal, suggested by Professor Harold G. 
 
 285. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 286. 512 U.S. 298 (1994). 
 287. Id. at 331. 
 288. See Bendix Autolite Corp., 486 U.S. at 897-98 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) 
(“[T]he outcome of any particular still-undecided issue under the current [dormant Com-
merce Clause balancing] methodology is in my view not predictable . . . .”). 
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Maier, which lacks such flaws and therefore should be adopted as the 
standard by which courts determine the validity of subnational in-
volvement in foreign affairs. 
Unlike the previously discussed proposals, Maier’s formulation of 
the foreign relations effects test purports to be based on a “careful 
examination” of Zscherig and related cases dealing with “the alloca-
tion of [state and federal] authority when the state and federal gov-
ernments have concurrent constitutional authority to deal with the 
same subject matter.”289 The following three-factor test resulted 
from his investigation: 
(1) Does the limited constituency of the state provide an appropri-
ate political context in which to make the policy judgment re-
quired to reach a decision? 
(2) Is the pertinent information that must be weighed to deter-
mine the wisdom of the policy decision available to the state 
decision maker(s)? 
(3) Will any possible adverse effects of the decision fall upon the 
entire nation or be localized within the state making the deci-
sion?290 
“[T]aken together,” Maier asserted, these three questions “consoli-
date all the pertinent considerations alluded to by the courts during 
the past 200 years in determining the exclusivity of national author-
ity in state law cases touching on foreign affairs where there is no di-
rect preemption by federal law.”291 Moreover, they “recognize[] the 
importance of centralized decision making where national interests 
must be protected from local influences, while preserving appropriate 
residual state Tenth Amendment power in the particular field.”292 
The Maier test thus frames the foreign relations effects test as a 
three-factor analysis that deems subnational foreign affairs-related ac-
tivities to have an impermissible direct effect on national foreign af-
fairs if (1) the subnational constituency does not provide an appro-
 
 289. Maier, supra note 82, at 838. Specifically, Maier derived his test from a comparison 
of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 
52 (1941), De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), and “numerous other cases that address 
this issue.” Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 839. 
 292. Id. at 838. 
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priate political context in which to make a particular internationally-
related policy decision, (2) the subnational constituency and/or 
policymaker lacks sufficient information to make an informed judg-
ment regarding that internationally-related policy decision, or (3) 
adverse affects from the subnational actor’s activities affect the nation 
at large rather than just the subnational actor. Admittedly, these de-
terminations are not as easy to apply as several of the other proposed 
approaches. It will require the courts to establish some further re-
quirements regarding whether a subnational forum constitutes an 
appropriate political context for a policy decision or whether subna-
tional decision makers possess sufficient information to engage in a 
particular area of policy making. Also, to avoid being fatally framed 
at a high level of generality, the test needs to limit its examination of 
possible adverse effects to those that might result from the country 
or countries against which a particular subnational action is directed 
rather than from the international community at large. 
Nevertheless, the strengths of the Maier approach stem from two 
sources. First, the manner in which the test is formulated sets cate-
gory-like limits on excessive subnational participation in foreign af-
fairs while simultaneously balancing the subnational actor’s interest 
in the international subject matter and ability to make proper deci-
sions against the national need for uniformity. Second, the Maier ap-
proach satisfies the requirements derived from Natsios and lacks in-
ternal defects that would warrant its being discarded. 
Thus, the Maier approach’s construction of the federal relations 
effects test prevails as the approach that the First Circuit should have 
adopted in Natsios—and that the Supreme Court should adopt when 
reviewing Natsios. Significantly, the Court’s adoption of this ap-
proach will “ensure that the values of local self-government that in-
form the federal structure can be effectively maintained without un-
due interference with the national conduct of foreign affairs.”293 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Massachusetts Burma Law constitutes one of the most sig-
nificant developments to date in the evolution of constituent diplo-
macy and the foray of subnational actors into the arena of foreign af-
fairs. Not only did the Massachusetts Burma Law enact the first state 
 
 293. Id. at 839. 
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selective purchasing law of its kind but the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ recent decision in National Foreign Trade Council v. 
Natsios,294 which declared the Massachusetts Burma Law to be an in-
valid usurpation of federal authority over foreign affairs, has accentu-
ated constitutional questions regarding the relationship between fed-
eralism and foreign affairs and other related issues. 
Perhaps the most significant question raised by the First Circuit’s 
decision in Natsios involves the manner in which courts should con-
strue the foreign relations effects test established by the Supreme 
Court in Zschernig v. Miller to determine the constitutionality of 
subnational activities in foreign affairs. In Natsios, the First Circuit 
formulated the effects test at a high degree of generality that focused 
on various factual factors that, in the court’s view, demonstrated that 
the Massachusetts Burma Law exerted an impermissibly direct effect 
on United States foreign relations. However, a careful examination 
of the court’s construction of the test and the ramifications of post–
Zschernig developments in U.S. constitutional law, global geopoli-
tics, and global interdependence reveals that the court erred by con-
struing the test too broadly and at a high level of generality that er-
roneously promoted exclusive federal authority over foreign affairs. 
The major question derived from Natsios, therefore, is how 
courts should formulate the foreign relations effects test so as to al-
low greater subnational participation while protecting national inter-
ests and preventing absolute federal exclusivity. Though scholars and 
commentators have suggested various possible approaches, only Pro-
fessor Harold G. Maier’s three-part, limited balancing test ade-
quately accomplishes the task. The courts, therefore, should adopt 
the Maier construction of the foreign relations effects test as the 
proper standard by which to judge the validity of subnational forays 
into foreign affairs like the Massachusetts Burma law. 
Patrick J. Thurston 
 
 294. 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. granted, Natsios v. National Foreign Trade 
Council, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999). 
